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1 Executive summary  
It is often argued that a key feature of auctions is the competitive pressure created on the overall value chain, 
and indeed all actors of the renewable energy (RE) sector. Moreover, it is often argued that auctions can 
induce a reduction in the level of actor diversity (AD) in some segments of the value chain, and especially in 
the project development sector. In the process of designing an auction, policy makers must make specific 
decisions and trade-offs related to the auction design elements (DEs). Depending on those trade-offs, 
auctions may favour certain types of actors over others, and this may lead to increased levels of market 
concentration (MC).1 This present study empirically analyses the following two topics: 
 The impacts of different auction DEs on MC in the project development and component 
manufacturing segments of the RE value chain. 
 The relative impact of auctions (as compared to other (contextual) factors influencing the value 
chain) on MC in the project development and component manufacturing segments of the value 
chain. 
Case study analysis were undertaken in four countries, namely Peru (solar PV; wind power), Spain (onshore 
wind power), South Africa (solar PV; wind power; and concentrated solar power (CSP)), and the United 
Kingdom (offshore wind). In order to get an in-depth and up-to-date understanding of how auctions and their 
DEs influence project developers and component manufacturers, country and technology level case studies 
were undertaken based on structured interviews with key experts in the respective countries.2  
The main findings of this study are set out below.  
Auction DEs 
The relative importance of the perceived impact of auction DEs on the MC of project developers and 
component manufacturers across all case countries is shown in Figure 1 (number of actors) and Figure 2 
(diversity of actors). A broad spread can be observed in terms of how DEs affect MC.  
The positive and negative impacts of specific DEs on MC are perceived to be more pronounced for project 
developers, than for component manufacturers. In other words, project developers seem to be more 
“exposed” and affected by auction DEs as regards the two considered measures of market concentration. As 
one expert phrased it, “project developers find themselves at the sharp and business end of RE auctions, 
whereas component manufacturers are relatively more shielded.”  
Certain DEs stand out as having a consistently strong positive (increasing) or negative (decreasing) impact 
on the number and diversity of project developers and component manufacturers; impacts that are observed 
in all four countries of analysis. The use of transparent publicly-disclosed auction schedules, as well as 
conducting auctions with high frequency, are clearly considered to be elements which increase both the 
number and diversity of actors in project developer and component manufacturer value chain segments; a 
trend that was also observed in all four countries. The opposite is true for all kinds of prequalification 
requirements. 
                                                             
1 MC is defined as the distribution of a given market among the participating companies. MC reflects both the number of 
firms within the market/sector (and/or participating in the auction) and the diversity of those firms (i.e. the degree of 
heterogeneity with respect to the size of those firms). To date, very limited empirical analysis has been undertaken on 
the impacts of auctions on MC in renewable energy supply chains. 
2 Expert elicitation-based interviews were used, given the difficulty to gain representative samples on developers and 
equipment manufacturers (an issue that effectively ruled out the possibility of using a large multivariate sample 
methodological approach). In addition, surveys are more data-intensive, require a greater length of time and there is a 
much higher risk of non-response than compared with the use of expert elicitations.  
The interviewed experts were selected based on their being very well-acquainted with the country level auction 
programme, and their significant knowledge of the value chain (particularly as regards project developers and component 
manufacturers). The selected experts came from a broad range of backgrounds. These included, for instance, policy 
makers, energy sector and market experts, stakeholders from financial institutions that regularly invest in renewable 
energy projects, RE industry association representatives, and other relevant actors. 
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Figure 1: Ranking of DE impact strength on number of developers and component manufacturers 
 
Source: Own elaboration (2020) 
Figure 2: Ranking of DE impact strength on diversity of developers and component manufacturers 
 
Source: Own elaboration (2020) 
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The perceived relative importance of auctions, as compared to specific auction DEs and context conditions, 
varies considerably between countries with respect to their impact on the two measures of MC. If anything, 
this confirms the assumption that auctions themselves are by no means the major determinant of MC in the 
two considered stages of the value chain. Country-specific context (and other) factors will always also play 
a certain role in shaping the prevailing MC.  
 In Peru, for example, the use of auctions themselves (and not specific auction DEs, or context 
factors) is clearly considered to be the most important determinant of MC.  
 In South Africa, however, there is no clear distinction between auctions, auction DEs and contextual 
factors, in terms of their respective perceived levels of importance in affecting MC. However, as 
concerns actor diversity, the conclusion is far clearer: auction DEs are the most important 
determinant of MC (for both project developers and component manufacturers).  
 The results for Spain suggest that the use of auctions is the least important determinant of number 
and diversity (MC) in that country’s wind power markets, whereas contextual factors are of highest 
importance in determining MC for component manufacturers. One possible reason for the relative 
high degree of importance awarded to contextual factors could be that RE auctions are mandated 
to be used for all EU Member States, and as such, are now simply part of the landscape. Perhaps 
what matters most now are (stable) macro-economic conditions and an unambiguous commitment 
at the national level to continue to decarbonise the country’s power sector and broader economy.   
 In the case of the UK (offshore wind), a range of views were shared and there is no consensus among 
interviewed experts regarding the most important determinant of MC amongst project developers 
and component manufacturers.  
The DEs which tend to affect MC to a greater extent (i.e. the frequency of auction rounds, the existence (or 
not) of a transparent auction schedule, and prequalification requirements), are the DEs that are most likely to 
get tangled up with non-auction policy areas. These DEs have implications for, and are affected and shaped 
by, certain factors that lie outside of auction theory. For instance, the schedule of future auctions can be an 
element of broader industrial development policy, climate policy and wider economic policy making.  
The relative importance of auctions  
In general terms, interviewed experts held a range of diverging views as to whether auctions, auction DEs, or 
context conditions, are most important in terms of shaping the number and diversity of actors in the two 
value chain segments of interest (see Figure 3).    
In Peru, for example, the overall use of auctions (as opposed to context factors, and specific auction DEs), 
were perceived to be a relatively more influential determinant of the number and diversity of project 
developers and component manufacturers, while specific auction DEs or context conditions were found to 
be of secondary importance.3 In South Africa, the overall picture is less clear, with recorded responses not 
allowing for the clear identification of a most influential determinant of the number of project developers or 
component manufacturers. With respect to the diversity of project developers and component 
manufacturers, however, specific DEs may have represented a defining factor in South Africa. In Spain, 
experts’ judgements clearly point towards the relative importance of context conditions for both the number 
and diversity of component manufacturers. With respect to project developers, experts’ responses indicate 
that both context conditions and specific DEs may have been critical for the number of developers, while the 
latter may have been slightly more influential for component manufacturers. In the case of the UK, there is 
no consensus among interviewed experts regarding the most important determinant of MC amongst project 
developers and component manufacturers.   
                                                             
3 Peruvian experts also reported that auctions are seen to be a well-established tool in the international context, and a 
critical part of helping attract international attention towards investing in renewable energy projects in Peru. Several 
interviewed experts mentioned that for Peru to develop a competitive and scaled-up renewable energy sector, it is vital 
that it develops a market that can compete internationally, including with, for example, neighbouring Chile and Brazil, 
which may be viewed by some as currently being more established and experienced markets.     
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Figure 3: The relative importance of auctions, DEs and context conditions  
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The relative importance of contextual factors 
Context conditions and related factors were found to affect the number and diversity of project developers 
and component manufacturers in an overall neutral or positive way, as shown in Figure 4.  
Figure 4: Contextual factors’ influence on project developers and component manufacturers  
 
Source: Own elaboration (2020) 
An important aspect to bear in mind is that the RE sectors of the four countries that were analysed in this 
study already had relatively high levels of MC. This is an important contextual factor, and any specific 
decisions concerning auction-related or contextual factors that are understood to increase MC (even) further 
could be of relatively higher importance compared to decisions on the same factor in a RE market with 
generally lower market concentration. One might argue that, where a central policy objective is to increase 
market competition (i.e. increase the number and diversity of actors) in a RE market that is currently highly 
concentrated (i.e. low competition), there is relatively less margin for error in setting the auction DEs at the 
“right” levels.   
This study has identified patterns of DEs with similar effects on MC (number and diversity) across countries, 
which may hint towards the existence of globally relevant effects. This suggests the existence of important 
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implications for policy makers and authorities responsible for the design of RE auctions, in their efforts to 
balance sector and market development objectives, MC objectives, and other explicit auction outcome 
objectives (such as yielding competitive prices, and the timely development of projects, amongst other 
things).    
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2 Background and context 
Work Package 4 (WP4) of the AURES 2 project focuses on the effects of RE auctions on the RE sector. The 
overall aim of WP 4 is twofold. On the one hand, within WP 4.1 and WP 4.2, the impacts of RES auctions and 
the DEs of auctions on the RE sector supply chain (SC) (market concentration (MC), reflected on the number 
and diversity of firms) will be identified, focusing on two main stages of the value chain (i.e. component 
manufacturing, and project development). On the other hand, in WP 4.3, the impacts of auctions as well as 
auction DEs on technological innovation will be analysed. This report focuses on the first of the above-
described aims: an empirical analysis of the impacts of auctions on the supply chain.  
2.1 Focus of this study  
It has traditionally been argued that a main feature of auctions is the competitive pressure created on the 
overall value chain and all actors of the RE sector. Moreover, it is often argued that auctions can induce a 
reduction in the level of actor diversity (AD) in some segments of the value chain (and the project 
development sector, in particular).   
The two above-mentioned arguments apply to both the overall use of auctions (as opposed to 
administratively-set remuneration, e.g. Feed-in tariffs (FiTs)), and the specific choices concerning the DEs 
used in auctions. In other words, depending on the specific DEs chosen, auctions may favour certain types 
of actors over others. This may lead to increased levels of market concentration.  
MC is defined as the distribution of a given market among the participating companies. MC reflects both the 
number of firms within the market/sector (and/or participating in the auction) and the diversity of those firms 
(i.e. the degree of heterogeneity with respect to the size of those firms). To date, very limited empirical 
analysis has been undertaken on the impacts of auctions on MC in RE supply chains. As such, the objectives 
of this study include: 
 The estimation of the perceived impacts of different DEs on the number and diversity of firms in two 
stages of the RE value chain (i.e., project developers and component manufacturers). 
 The estimation of the perceived relative impacts of auctions and auction DEs on the number and 
diversity of firms as compared to other (contextual) factors influencing the value chain. 
Based on the study’s objectives, a central hypothesis emerges:  
Some DEs in auctions are likely to have a considerable impact on the number and diversity of project 
developers and component manufacturers, whereas the effects of other DEs are likely to be very small 
or negligible. In particular, it is hypothesised that a high frequency of auctions (more than once a year), 
a transparent schedule of auctions, as well as stringent prequalification requirements are relevant in 
this regard. 
The MC of RE supply chains can be expected to be affected by many factors, including key government 
policies on energy, industrial development, trade, and the environment, as well as socioeconomic and 
country-context factors (ICSTD 2017). Both local policies and policies in the international context will have 
an influence to this end, i.e., firms participating in auctions abroad, instead of auctions within their home 
country, because they see higher profitability there; or local content requirements (LCRs) in non-EU countries 
affecting European industry. With respect to local policies, the instruments (e.g., auctions, versus 
administratively-set remuneration), the choices around specific auction DEs, and the prevailing policy 
framework conditions in a country (and especially, the existence (or not) of targets and policy stability) are 
all highly influential factors in this regard.  
Therefore, auctions and auction DEs are expected to be one among many possible factors that impact on 
MC in the supply chain. One implication of this is that authorities’ attempts to improve the number and 
diversity of firms in RE supply chains by including and/or adjusting some auction DEs may meet (only) limited 
“success” in terms of their effects on the supply chain. Potentially, some adjustments may have detrimental 
effects on other measures, such as the effectiveness or efficiency of auctions. The impact of auctions and 
auction DEs can be expected to be both RE technology-specific and country-specific, and may depend on the 
prevailing local conditions (including, for instance, the existence of an industrial base; workforce and firms’ 
capabilities; and access to financial and technical resources, etc.). 
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2.2 Market Concentration in the Context of Auctions 
Some authors have argued that whilst auctions can yield an economically efficient allocation of resources 
from a competitive market perspective, their outcomes are not so optimal from other perspectives (IRENA, 
2019). (Fell, 2019), for example, claims that auctions may not produce a diversified landscape of actors or 
generate the shared benefits envisioned for a just and inclusive energy transition (when such objectives are 
not integrated in their design). Usually, auctions are cost-based, i.e. the bidders that offer the lowest bids are 
awarded. Large and established companies are well-placed to offer relatively lower than average bid prices, 
making use of economies of scale or a vertically integrated value chain. Smaller scale actors can face two 
main problems, namely: (i) they can have systematically higher generation costs compared to those of large 
actors, due to their lacking economy of scale advantages; and  (ii), they are generally less able to spread their 
(investment) risks as broadly as larger actors are able to, due to their typically smaller project portfolios 
(Simone Steinhilber; Emilie Rosenlund, 2016). As such, purely price-centric auctions may crowd out small 
project developers, thereby centralizing market power, and excluding local communities from decision 
making processes (IRENA (2019); Fell (2019);  Del Río & Linares (2014). However, the presence of small scale 
and new entrant players in RE markets, and the development of local RE industries and supply and value 
chains, are all important components of a just and inclusive energy transition (IRENA, 2019). 
2.2.1 Market Concentration: Good or Bad? 
Market concentration can be expected to affect the efficiency of support schemes and support costs. 
Auction designs that limit actor diversity can have long-term implications for the market and sector as a 
whole: providing a level playing field for small, medium and large scale participants would be more likely to 
lead to the inclusion of all, an outcome that has positive implications for competition, innovation and local 
“buy-in” to the energy transition. Highly concentrated markets can also be problematic for the price outcomes 
of auction themselves. The presence of a sufficient number of actors (i.e. low market concentration) is a 
prerequisite for competition, free price formation and, as a result, for the lowest possible auction prices 
(Bayer, Schäuble, et al., 2018, p.310).  
Market concentration is traditionally understood as problematic from a public benefit perspective, especially 
as regards the intuitive relationship between high market concentration and collusion (Bayer, Schäuble, et al., 
2018). This appears to suggest that a high participation of small-scale actors should be a clear objective for 
policy makers. However, small might not always be so beautiful. There is a presumption that the relationship 
between market concentration and competition is unidirectional and negative; specifically, that a sufficiently 
high number of actors (i.e. low market concentration) is a prerequisite for competition and free price 
formation. According to the seminal approach of Bain (Bain, 1951) (Bain 1956) market structure determines 
the results of the market in terms of competition. However, Demsetz (1973) highlighted that this relationship 
is bidirectional, with structure (concentration) influencing the results (competition), but also the other way 
around (as shown in Figure 5).This suggests a circular relationship, with continuous feedbacks between 
market structure and competition. 
Figure 5: The bi-directional relationship between MC and competition 
 
 
Source: Own elaboration, based on (Bain, 1956) and Demsetz (1973) 
 
A further important point of note is that policy objectives of increasing the diversity of firms (a component of 
market concentration) may be reached at the expense of worsening other policy goals, such as efficiency or 
effectiveness. If incumbent actors have a long track record and significant experience in developing and 
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constructing RE generation projects, the introduction of new (and far less experienced) actors may lead to 
overall lower project realization rates. Synergies are also possible: increased diversity of bidders may 
enhance the public acceptance4 of the auction.  
2.2.2 Factors Influencing Changes in Market Concentration  
Both the theoretical and empirical industrial organization literature suggests that there are several key factors 
affecting market concentration. A traditional distinction between two categories of determinants of the level 
of concentration in a market is:  
I. Technological reasons: They determine the need for a large plant size in order to reach an efficient 
production level, i.e. the existence of economies of scale in the section of the production function 
being considered.  
II. Barriers to entry: Entry barriers in the market which prevent the entry of new firms and which can be 
due to legal restrictions, product differentiation or technical capabilities.  
 
There is a long tradition of empirical studies on the sources of market concentration, as well as on 
classifications of the type of drivers (Pickford 1983, (Ratnayake (1999); Bhattacharya & Bloch (2000); Mueller 
et al. (1974); Jenny & Weber (1978), among others). However, the classification of Lypczynski et al (2005) is 
deemed particularly useful for the purposes of this report, since it facilitates linking the causes of market 
concentration with DEs in RE auctions in a more straightforward way. These authors distinguish between 
economies of scale, barriers to entry, sunk costs, regulation, industry lifecycle, distinctive between economies 
of scale, barriers to entry, sunk costs, regulation, industry lifecycle, capabilities and core competencies as the 
sources of market concentration. The authors of this study consider that economies of scale, barriers to 
entry and sunk costs are the most relevant drivers of market concentration in the context of this report, and 
hence the analysis presented in this paper focuses on the influence of auctions and DEs with respect to these 
three drivers.  
2.2.3 The Impact of Auction Design Elements on Project Developers5 
Project developers’ and component manufacturers’ economies of scale, barriers to entry and sunk costs are 
directly or indirectly affected by auctions, and specifically by their design elements.  
This section describes the main design elements in RE auctions, and for which the impact on the market 
concentration of project developers and component manufacturers is being analysed in this study.  
I. Volume: There are three main ways to set the volume auctioned: 
a. Capacity targets: A total quantity in terms of MW is auctioned.  
b. Electricity generation targets: There is a goal of a total amount of MWh. 
c. Budget (financial support) targets: There is an overall amount of support to be provided. It 
can be combined with the other two alternatives.  
A main challenge in RE auctions is to set the volume at an “appropriate” level, i.e., neither too high 
nor too low. Whether or not to publicly disclose the volumes is also an important decision to be taken. 
II. Timing: The duration of the period between the announcement of the call for the auction and the 
time when the actual bidding occurs is also a key feature of the auction. Most importantly, the 
existence of regular auction rounds, with a clear schedule is a critical design element. Setting the 
number of rounds to be undertaken in a given year is a difficult, technology-specific issue. 
                                                             
4 CEER (2016) stresses that ensuring a high diversity of bidders (investment groups, energy suppliers, project firms and 
private investors) is a potentially important aspect for achieving overall public acceptance of the auction. A higher degree 
of diversity (and number) of bidders reduces the risk of not meeting official RE targets due to the non-compliance of a 
single bidder, although the risk of ineffectiveness is probably higher with new entrants and smaller actors (versus 
experienced and larger companies). 
5 This subsection heavily draws on del Río (2017c). 
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III. Diversity: Policy makers may be willing to introduce DEs which increase diversity with respect to 
technologies, locations, actors and sizes of the installations for a number of reasons (see del Río 
2017c for an extensive explanation). Diversity could be promoted in an auction by organizing 
different auctions per alternative (e.g., technology-neutral vs. technology-specific), by including 
minimum quota per alternative, by providing different remuneration levels for different alternatives, 
or by lowering prequalification requirements or penalties for specific actor categories (i.e. small sized 
actors).  
IV. Participation Conditions (Facilitation and Requirements): Several elements may facilitate the 
participation of actors in an auction, while others are rather requirements for this participation: 
a. Streamlining administrative procedures: Administrative procedures may severely restrict 
participation in an auction and, thus, competition levels. Therefore, measures to streamline 
them may facilitate higher levels of participation.  
b. Supporting dialogue with stakeholders and information provision: In some countries, policy 
makers meet with potential bidders to inform them about auction design and to canvass 
their views in order to incorporate their feedback into (improved) auction design. Critical 
information that could enhance participation in the auction may be provided (e.g. RE 
resource potentials). 
c. Prequalification requirements: These are the requirements to be met to participate in the 
bidding procedure. Potential bidders’ compliance (or not) with prequalification requirements 
are checked before the auction takes place.  
Prequalification requirements can apply to the specifications of the offered project (such as 
technical requirements, documentation requirements and preliminary licenses), and to the 
bidding party (providing evidence of the technical or financial capability of the bidding party) 
(Held et al., 2014). They are used to help prove the seriousness of the bid and/or the 
probability of realization of the project. As with other auction DEs, the challenge is to set 
them at appropriate levels (i.e. neither too stringent, nor too lenient). Viscid (2019) 
distinguishes between Preliminary Grid Access, Environmental Permitting, Environmental 
Impact Assessment, Land Use Rights, Company Net Worth, Previous Experience 
(Technology), Previous Experience (Size), Previous Experience (Financing), Resource 
Assessment, Energy Output Studies, Connection to Grid Study, Local Subsidiary Formed and 
Credit Rating. 
d. Local content rules refer to the requirement to use RE equipment which is manufactured by 
local firms.6 
e. Seller concentration rules might be implemented (such as in California, India and Portugal) 
in order to mitigate the risk of market power. Successful winners in one round may be 
prevented from participating in a later round or the size of the bidding share by a single actor 
might be limited. 
V. Support Conditions (Types and Forms of Remuneration): Remuneration in an auction can be provided 
for generation (MWh, generation-based) or capacity (MW, investment-based). In addition, there are 
several instruments to set the remuneration for energy, including Feed-in Tariffs (FiTs) and Feed-in 
Premiums (FiPs):  
a. Under FiTs, a total payment per kWh (or MWh) of RES-E generated, paid in the form of 
guaranteed prices and combined with a purchase obligation by the utilities is provided. 
b. Under FiPs, a payment per kWh on top of the electricity wholesale-market price is granted. 
Within FiPs, a main distinction is between fixed and sliding FiPs. Fixed FiPs are set once and 
do not alter. The total remuneration thus depends on the market prices and is therefore more 
uncertain, which raises investors’ risks and ultimately increases the cost of capital and the 
levelized cost of electricity (LCOE). Sliding FiPs are set at regular intervals to fill the gap 
                                                             
6 They can be set by requiring that a percentage of the renewable energy equipment is manufactured by local firms or by 
organizing two auctions: one with domestic content requirements and the other one without. 
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between the average market price perceived by all generators of a given technology and a 
pre-determined strike price. The difference in returns is more modest than with ex ante FiPs, 
and the increases in risks and costs of capital are less pronounced.  
VI. Selection Criteria: Price-only auctions are organized using only one criterion (the bid price). In multi-
criteria auctions, the price is the main criterion among other criteria (e.g. local content rules, impact 
on local R&D, industry and jobs and environmental impacts) (see, for example, (Held et al., 2014). 
VII. Auction Format: Depending on whether the auctioned object can be split between multiple winning 
bidders, auctions are referred to as single-item or multi-item auctions. In a single-item auction there 
is a single product which is allocated to a single owner and the product cannot be split. In a multi-
item auction the auctioned product is split among different owners and bids are submitted for only 
part or the total auctioned amount (AURES 2016).  
VIII. Auction Type: An important distinction is between static (i.e. sealed bid) and dynamic auctions. Under 
sealed-bid auctions, project developers simultaneously submit their bids with an undisclosed offer 
of the price at which the electricity would be sold. An auctioneer ranks and awards projects until the 
sum of the quantities offered covers the volume of energy being auctioned. In dynamic auctions, for 
example under the multi-round descending-clock auction, the auctioneer offers a price in an initial 
round, and developers bid their offers of the quantity they would be willing to provide at that price. 
The auctioneer then progressively lowers the offered price in successive rounds until the quantity in 
a bid matches the quantity to be procured (previously decided by the auction authority). Hybrid 
models may use the descending clock auction in a first phase and the sealed-bid auction in a second 
phase, as in Brazil (Hawila et al., 2013). 
IX. Pricing Rules: There are basically two different ways to set support levels in sealed-bid auctions. 
Under uniform pricing all winners receive the strike price set by the last bid needed to meet the quota 
or the first bid that does not meet the quota. Thus, either the highest accepted bid determines the 
award price, or the lowest rejected bid determines the award price (highest accepted bid, or HAB and 
lowest rejected bid, or LRB, respectively).  Under the pay-as-bid (PAB) alternative, the strike price sets 
the amount of generation eligible for support and each winner receives his/her bid.  
X. Price Ceilings: In order to limit the costs of support, the auctioneer can set a ceiling (reservation) price 
for each technology, above which projects are not considered (Hawila et al., 2013). An important 
choice to be made if a maximum price is implemented is its level. Again, setting the ceiling price at 
an “appropriate” level is not a trivial exercise. A further important decision is whether or not to publicly 
disclose this price. 
XI. Realization Period: Deadlines need to be established, setting the date by which the awarded projects 
need to be built. The duration of this “grace period” is a key issue, with a risk of too long or too short 
periods. 
XII. Penalties: Penalties can take different forms: for example, they can forbid participation in successive 
auctions, reduce the level of support, reduce the length of the support period by the time of the delay, 
lead to the confiscation of bid bonds and result in penalty payments. Again, a main issue is whether 
they are set too high or too low. 
2.2.4 The Stages of the Value Chain of Interest and the Role of Contextual 
Factors 
This study seeks to analyse the impact of auctions and DEs on two stages of RE value chains, i.e., project 
developers and component manufacturers. The impact of auctions and DEs on project developers is direct, 
given that DEs directly affect the participation of project developers in the auction. With respect to component 
manufacturers, the impact is expected to be less direct and potentially more difficult to observe, but 
nonetheless it is worthy of analysis. 
One main assumption is that local component manufacturers would benefit from higher profit margins by 
the participants in the auctions (bidders) who would then have to buy their products. DEs in the auction which 
lead to squeezing profit margins would tend to put pressure on them to also cut down profit margins and 
produce more efficient components (either cost-reducing or revenue-increasing technologies). It is important 
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to consider not only short-term effects, but also long-term effects and, in particular the impact on future 
investments. It can be expected that lower profit margins by equipment manufacturers would affect the 
possibility to carry out investments in the future. 
The impact of auctions on project developers and component manufacturers can only be considered as one 
among various influences. In general, energy policy is as relevant as industrial policy in this context. In fact, 
as argued in (IRENA, 2019), for countries with weak domestic supply chains, measures are needed to 
augment industrial capabilities within and beyond the energy sector; incubate and develop supplier firms; 
engage in joint ventures for learning-by-doing processes; step up education and training efforts; and pursue 
opportunities for regional cooperation and shared advancement.  
A stable policy framework is a central determinant of market concentration, but also for the functioning of 
the auction itself. Holding a reputation for having an unstable policy framework – for instance, due to sudden 
legal and regulatory framework changes that affect the financial viability of potential investments, or (even 
worse) retroactive changes that affect existing projects – can have negative impacts on the confidence and 
interest of private sector firms to develop projects (Botta, 2019). The degree of ambition in RE targets is also 
relevant in this context. For example, according to Viscidi and Yépez (2020), ambitious RE targets in Chile 
and announced auctions in 2019 and 2020 have created long-term confidence in the market and are behind 
the large level of participation in the recent auction held in that country.  
One aspect related to regulation is the ease of obtaining the necessary administrative permits. Several 
aspects of the regulatory environment may entail risks for investors, including land lease agreements, land 
use consent, construction permits, environmental permits, grid connection permits, generation licenses, 
power system dispatch rules, etc. (Dobrotkova et al 2018). Auctioneers may address some of these issues 
before the auction and reduce risks through minimizing long and cumbersome bureaucratic processes, 
regulatory barriers and uncertainty related to permitting and licensing that the project developer would 
otherwise need to face with multiple central and state government agencies (Dobrotkova et al 2018, p.135). 
It should be taken into account, however, that risks are sometimes not reduced, but transferred. The issue is 
also if they are transferred to the actor who is better able to address them, as it is the case with administrative 
permits. 
On the other hand, there are factors which influence the levels of participation, but which are external to the 
auction design and to RE policy in general. Viscidi and Yépez (2020) mentions the overall investment climate 
of the country, the credit risk profile of the off-taker, the size of the market, the availability of transmission 
and distribution infrastructure, and the RE resource potential. Low levels of investor confidence in the market 
and the lack of an enabling environment would negatively influence participation in the auction. IRENA (2019) 
groups those RE non-policy factors into two categories, i.e., (i) country-specific conditions, such as the 
potential of RE resources, financing costs, installation and building costs (land, labour, energy, etc.), the ease 
of access to equipment, foreign exchange rates, general fiscal legislation); and (ii) investor confidence and 
learning curve, such as influenced through the credibility of the off-taker and additional guarantees, the 
presence of a stable and enabling environment that is conducive to market growth and past experience with 
auctions for both auctioneer and developers. 
2.3 An Integration of Approaches on the Impact of Auction Design 
Elements on Market Concentration 
In this section, the concepts of market concentration and auctions are more formally linked and integrated. 
The aim of this integration is to provide an analytical framework which serves as the basis to identify the 
impact of those design elements on market concentration, taking different determinants of market 
concentration into account and, particularly, barriers to entry and sunk costs. The main assumption is that, 
with respect to its alternative, the choice of a design element will affect at least one of those determinants 
and, thus, influence one of the two aspects of MC (number and diversity of firms). 
Changes in MC may be due to:  
I. Changes in the degree of homogeneity of firm sizes. 
II. Changes in the number of existing firms (given the entry and exit of firms).  
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In the “Bain model”, structure refers to those two aspects:  
I. The distribution of the sizes of the firms present in the market. 
II. The degree of concentration of the activity in a limited number of (large) firms which, thus, enjoy a 
high degree of market power. 
Our starting point is that both fields of research (the industrial organisation literature and auction theory) can 
be connected through the impact of DEs on some intermediate variables (revenues, costs and risks of 
participating in an auction) which affect the participation in the auction. These variables influence the 
determinants of MC (see Section 2.2) and, thus, market concentration. The design of auctions can vary 
significantly, with important effects on the number and quality of bidders (Viscidi and Yépez 2020, p.5). 
Alternative DEs in auctions have differing impacts on potential bidders, since they affect those revenues, 
costs and risks. In other words, revenues, costs and risks are (partly) dependent on the specific design of 
tenders. Clearly, these three factors are somehow related since investors are encouraged to participate in 
the auction by an attractive risk-return profile. As Botta (2019, p.1) puts it, “riskier or less well-designed policy 
instruments would lead risk-adverse investors to seek higher returns for their investment. Given the State 
supported nature of RE investments, higher subsidies would be therefore necessary to generate an attractive 
risk-return profile”.  
Only those project developers who offer the lowest remuneration rates (e.g. in €/MWh) receive remuneration. 
As indicated by Bayer et al (2018, p.314) “for the project developers, the remuneration rates offered are 
composed of, in simplified terms, the sum of expected costs (including risk markups) and the desired profit 
margins, divided by the expected electricity generation. The competition in auctions creates cost pressure 
and reduces the bidders’ expectations with regard to returns” (Bayer et al 2018).  
Very low expected revenues would lead to low incentives to participate in the auction. As put by Botta (2019, 
p.6), “Speculative bidding, broadly defined as bids that are priced too low to be economically viable, can 
severely weaken investment attractiveness.” 
High costs and risks would deter participation in the auction (lower number of firms) and also probably fall 
asymmetrically on different types of actors (large vs. small). 
Costs and risks are interrelated to some extent, since higher risks increase the costs of capital and, thus, 
overall levels of CAPEX for projects. However, they are kept separate in order to better illustrate the influence 
of DEs on those variables.  
In turn, high/lower revenues, costs and risks probably influence different types of actors (e.g. large vs. small, 
incumbents vs. new entrants) in a different manner. This has an impact on both aspects of MC (number of 
firms, and heterogeneity of firms). DEs may have an indirect impact on MC, whereas others may affect MC 
directly (e.g. seller concentration rules). A schematic overview of the analytical framework is shown in Figure 
6.  
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Figure 6: Analytical framework overview 
 
Source: Own elaboration (2020) 
Thus, compared to administratively-set remuneration levels, project developers (bidders) compete between 
each other for a given remuneration level in auctions. In addition, in administratively-set remuneration 
schemes, all project developers are eligible to receive support. By contrast, auction participants may not be 
awarded in the auction and, thus, incur sunk costs. This leads to greater costs in an auction compared to 
administratively-set support. The restrictions in the access to support and the lower profit margins result in 
a lower number of project developers than with administratively-set support. This means a lower number of 
companies, but also ones that are better able to cope with the relatively lower revenues and higher costs and 
risks (hence, lower profit margins).  
Some DEs may induce a greater level of competition and/or greater costs (i.e., more stringent prequalification 
requirements) and, thus, lead to lower profit margins than others. In particular, some DEs may induce a 
greater level of competition, leading to low bid prices. We could expect that those DEs would lead to a lower 
incentive to participate in the auctions, i.e., a lower entry of firms in the market. This would induce a greater 
level of MC in both senses, i.e. lower numbers firms as well as less diversity of actors. Large players are more 
likely to cope better with low profit margins, given that size matters, i.e. due to economies of scale and 
financial strength, but also because lower profit margins are likely to lead to mergers and acquisitions. When 
price competition is fierce, firms must produce at large scales if they want to survive and this limits the 
number of firms in the market. A higher level of profit encourages entry, whereas a lower profit induces exit 
and mergers (consolidation). 
The opportunity to drive down costs through scale effects can be an important motive to offer low-price bids 
(Amazo et al (2018). In Germany, synergies between nearby offshore wind farms can help reduce the high 
cost for tailor-made maintenance concepts and downtime management. Ørsted, for example, plans to 
combine the OWP West and Borkum Riffgrund West 2 projects into one large-scale project with the option 
of adding more volume in the 2018 auction, which they successfully achieved. 
Therefore, although lower prices in the auction is good news for the minimization of support costs in the 
short term, they may lead to fewer project developers (owners), a more concentrated market, and possibly 
to a lower level of competition in the future. In other words, there might be detrimental effects in the longer 
term. 
Lower profit margins for the project developers and investors awarded in the auction could be expected to 
influence other stages of the value chain. We could hypothesize that lower profit margins would push 
equipment manufacturers to produce low-cost (or revenue-increasing) equipment. In turn, very low profit 
margins may entail a huge challenge for future investments. Who would invest in a sector with very low rates 
of return? 
Note that it is not only an issue of lower revenues, but also of greater costs and risks. Most risks are related 
to the sunk costs before the auction, since bidders will incur those costs without knowing whether their bids 
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will be awarded. And it is also an issue of different types of actors having different capacities to cope with 
lower profit margins and greater risks. In particular, small actors may be detrimentally affected in this context. 
MC may be affected by other factors which are not related to the auction. What these factors are is a purely 
empirical issue, and they are context-specific (related to country, technology and time). Policy risk is an 
important factor that affects participation (or not) in the auction. Policy risks might be affected by the 
anticipated changes in revenues generated via the implemented RE policy instrument (e.g. FiTs or green 
trading schemes, for instance). They are also affected by the policy framework conditions (e.g. the presence 
of guaranteed grid connection, the complexity in obtaining permits or the effectiveness of the judicial system) 
(Botta 2019). 
These external factors need to be taken into account in the empirical analysis. Furthermore, these factors 
probably differ per technology. Some studies carried out for other markets using the theory of industrial 
organization suggest the existence of a strong relationship between MC and the features of the technologies 
which are used in the market and which make up the minimum efficient size. Finally, it is beyond the scope 
of this present analysis (i.e. WP4 of the AURES 2 project) and, thus, of this report, to assess the influence of 
MC on competition. 
Finally, it is worth underlining that the existence of a given market structure conditions the design of auctions 
to some extent, which, in turn, may influence MC. For example, in markets with low penetration of renewables 
and few players, governments tend to implement technology-specific auctions. In more mature markets with 
large scale and many project developers, governments tend to transition to multi-technology auctions 
(Saygin et al 2018). Mora et al (2017) found that several market characteristics influence the design of 
auctions, including the expected market potential (project pipeline) and how this relates to the auction volume 
(timing of the next round and long term auction schedules), the average project size (per technology) and 
how this relates to auction volume and frequency (number of auction rounds per year), the expected number 
of bidders and bids, the distribution of project costs among bidders (how asymmetric, and systematically 
different project costs are) and the relative strengths of bidders and how familiar they are with each other 
(including, for example, how well they can assess each other’s costs). 
2.4 Scope of the Analysis 
Project developers and component manufacturers were chosen as the two stages of the RE value chain for 
the analysis conducted in this study, as opposed to the several alternatives that exist in this context, i.e.,  
bidders, material suppliers and O&M service providers. The boundaries between these stages are sometimes 
blurry, which hampers the analysis of distinct stages at times. For example, awarded bidders are different to 
developers, as some firms participate in the auction, initially develop the projects, and sell them to third 
parties. Thus, those actors (bidders) being awarded in the auction are not necessarily those who will develop 
the project. It is for this reason that the analysis undertaken and presented in this report focuses on project 
developers, and not project bidders (whom may, or may not, develop the project). Specifically, the study 
focuses on MC in the project development and manufacturing stages.  
Project developers buy the projects from these bidders / intermediaries and this may result in developers 
being large actors (since they are the ones able to pay for those built projects). This means that it is incorrect 
to assume that the bidders are “new entrants”, since what really matters is who develops the project in the 
end. These bidders / intermediaries may be reducing competition in the project development stage, leading 
to a higher market concentration. In practical terms, this means that project-by-project research is required 
in order to identify the actual developers of the project. 
Another defining factor is that project development and component manufacturing are the two stages in the 
value chain that are more directly impacted by auctions (i.e. the scale of impact reduces as one moves 
downstream in the value chain). This has practical advantages, given that the potentially small impact of 
auctions, and especially the specific DEs, on market concentration will be easier to record for those stages 
of the value chain that are directly affected. 
Finally, project developers and component manufacturers are also the two most important stages in terms 
of value creation for a sector (PV, CSP and onshore wind). The value chain of both wind and solar 
technologies are incredibly complex and involve several players as well as processes (ICSTD 2019). 
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Therefore, a focus on particular stages and actors is recommendable. The focus of this study for component 
manufacturers for wind is on turbine manufacturers, whereas for solar PV the focus has been placed on 
module manufacturers. They have the greatest importance in wind and solar PV value chains, respectively. 
According to Wind Europe (2019), wind turbine manufacturers are the largest contributor to wind energy total 
revenues (EUR 16.6/55.6 billion) and KPMG (2019) shows that turbine costs represent 70% of the cost of a 
wind farm. According to UNEF (2019), modules represent 50% of the costs of a solar PV installation in Spain.  
Table 1 lists some of the fundamental assumptions on the scope of the empirical analysis as well as the 
rationale behind them. 











Three aspects of the supply chain (SC) can be studied: number 
(how many firms), diversity (how different they are), depth 
(integration of different actors) and strength (how “good” they 
are) (IRENA 2019). First, the depth and strength of the supply 
chain are rather abstract concepts in the literature, whereas the 
former two are clearer (there are indicators). Second, the depth 
and strength entail quantitative and qualitative aspects which are 
very difficult to capture without modeling tools. Third, and 
perhaps more importantly, the breath and diversity of the SC on 
the one hand, and the strength of such SC might be interrelated 
with the former two being main drivers of the latter one 
(strength). For example, in the CSP market, numerous new actors 
have entered the market – a desperately needed development, 
given the thinning out of CSP supply chains in the last years. New 
actors are likely to bring innovation to the CSP value chain and, 
even more importantly, if at least some of them survive, the CSP 
value chain will become more robust and less dependent on 




and new entrants 
(vs. incumbents) 
We focus on 




We focus on size given: 1) The importance attached to this 
aspect in the literature of auctions, as well as in relevant policy-
relevant documents by worldwide institutions (EU Guidelines on 
State Aid, IRENA, USAID…); 2) The relevance attached to this issue 
in the current Directive 2001/2018 (see number (17) and article 
4); 3) The finding that the new entrants category is often closely 
(albeit not perfectly) related to the small actor category.  














There are at least three reasons for this choice. First, awarded 
bidders are not necessarily those developing the project. Second, 
these are the two stages in the SC more directly impacted by 
auctions. Third, they are also the two most important stages in 
terms of value creation for a sector (PV, CSP and wind onshore).  
Comparative 
impact of 
auctions or DEs 
on MC 
Impact of both 
auctions or DEs 
on MC 
This is the focus of the project (i.e. on auctions and its DEs). 
  






at the national 
level 
The impacts of auctions on supply chains may affect different 
countries at the same time. This may involve a positive impact at 
the local (national) level and a negative impact at the aggregate 
level (e.g., local content requirements). However, we focus on the 
national level.  
Despite the traditional discussion in economics about the focus 
on the aggregate level, in the last decade a parallel (perhaps even 
dominant) idea is that industrial policy has important local effects 
which should be analyzed and that the issue is not whether to use 
industrial policy (something that was not recommended by 
economists in the past), but rather how to use such policy 
(Rodrick 2014, The Economist 2010). 
An analysis of the 
perception of 
what the impacts 
are vs. and 
analysis of what 
the impacts are  
An analysis of 
the perception 
of what the 
impacts are 
Data are simply not available to carry out a complete, panel-data 
multi-variable regression of how auctions and different auction 
DEs impact the two aspects of the supply chain (breath and 
diversity), controlling for other effects. Therefore, in addition to 
some hard data, we have to go for a second best and analyze 
what key actors in the sector (very involved, very knowledgeable, 
etc.) believe is the impact of auctions and auction DEs through an 
expert elicitation survey. 
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2.5 Markets of focus 
2.5.1 Peru 
Peru is the fourth-largest country in Latin America, with strong economic and electricity demand growth. To 
date, Peru’s power generation sector has been dominated by hydropower and natural gas fired power. Non-
hydro RE continues to make a relatively small contribution to the country’s generation mix, but with significant 
solar irradiance and wind energy resources, there is significant potential for scaling up the roles of solar PV 
and wind power within Peru’s generation mix. 
In 2008, Peru created the legal framework for holding RE auctions through the introduction of Legislative 
Decree 1002, and which set RE as a national priority. The key details of Peru’s RE auction programme are 
summarised in Table 2. The first auction was held in 2009; a second was then held in 2011, a third in 2013 
and a fourth in 2015/16. Prior to the introduction of Legislative Decree 1002, there was no stable and 
transparent framework in place governing the remuneration of non-hydro RE power generation projects in 
Peru. The growth of Peru’s solar PV and wind power (as well as biomass power) sectors have been 
inextricably linked with that country’s use of RE auctions. More specific details of the auction characteristics 
are set out below.    
It is worth underlining that Peru’s solar PV and wind power markets are relatively highly concentrated , 
dominated by a relatively low number of larger scale organisations.  
Table 2: Summary of the Peruvian RE auction programme  
Topic / Aspect Description 
Description of when 
RES auctions were 
initiated, how many 
undertaken so far, 
which technologies 
Peru has conducted a total of four RE auctions since 2009, for both grid-
connected and off-grid electrification. The auction scheme in Peru is based on 
Law No. Law No. 28832 and Decree 1002, established in 2006 and 2008, 
respectively.  
The most recent auction round (i.e. the fourth round) of the Peruvian RE auction 
scheme was conducted in 2016. The Peruvian auctions were technology 
specific and used a non-disclosed price-cap per technology, with offers above 
the cap automatically disqualified. 
High level description of 
the results of the most 
recent auction  
In the fourth round of the Peruvian RE auction, more than 1700 GW/h per year 
of generation were awarded, roughly 740 GW/h per year of wind, around 520 
GW/h per year of solar, around 450 GW/h per year of hydro, and just below 30 
GW/h per year of biogas power. 
Any outstanding or 
unique characteristics 
of the auction 
programme / DEs to 
mention  
Over the course of the four Peruvian RE auctions the price for electricity 
generated from wind has decreased by more than 40%, and for solar PV 
generated electricity, the price has been pushed down by almost 80%. Key to 
the success of the scheme have been: (i) clear medium-term renewable 
electricity targets; (ii) analysis of the results and revision of the auction design 
based on the lessons learned, and (iii) transparency in the process (Lucas & 
Gómez, 2017). 
The auction is for generation (GWh). Electricity produced above the cap is sold 
at market prices, and projects that produce less than the amount specified in 
the bid are penalised by a reduction in the tariff. (Del Río, 2017a)  
Market concentration 
as measured through 
the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI)  
Solar PV AR4 (2 projects) – HHI 6716 
Wind power AR4 (3 projects) – HHI 6259  
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2.5.2 South Africa 
South Africa is a middle-income country and is the second largest economy in Africa. It has the largest power 
system of any country in Africa, and the generation mix is dominated by thermal power (especially coal-fired 
generation). The contribution of RE technologies to the overall mix continues to grow. RE will have a central 
and key role in South Africa’s energy future, not least in the context of the country’s excellent solar radiation 
and wind energy resources, its competitive industrial base, and the pressing need to achieve greater supply 
stability (for end-users) and improve the financial health of the overall power system.  
South Africa initiated its RE Independent Power Producer Procurement Programme (REIPPPP) in 2011, 
making it the first country on the African continent to implement a RE auction programme. To date, South 
Africa has held four auction rounds, which attracted very high levels of interest and bidding 
(oversubscription). This present study focuses on auctions for solar PV, wind power and CSP in South Africa. 
The key details of South Africa’s RE auction programme are summarised in Table 3.   
A single-round bidding programme was used, primarily with the aim of fast-tracking the power procurement 
process, as the country faced chronic and significant system capacity constraints. Hence there was a need 
to contract, construct and commission new (renewables-based) generation capacity in a timely way. In the 
absence of a prequalification round, but with the need to select only serious and quality bidders, a screening 
approach based on various stringent bidder qualification requirements was employed.  
The REIPPPP is unique in the context of the four country case studies because that programme established 
significant multicriteria requirements on bidders (i.e. the auction is not decided on price-only criteria). In 
particular, for a bid to be considered, two key economic development thresholds were required to be met: 
1. There must be a minimum of 40% “South African Entity Participation” in the bidding project 
company, and wherein South African citizens are defined as “the ultimate natural citizens to whom 
the shareholding benefits would accrue” (DOE SA, 2013).  
2. Bidders based in South Africa were required to achieve a Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment (BBBEE) contributor status level (CSL) of at least five, based on defined BBBEE 
codes and evaluation criteria.  
These and certain other aspects of the REIPPPP make South Africa’s auction programme stand out 
somewhat as being relatively progressive in the broader international context, through its clear goals of 
promoting a just energy transition (e.g. via local community and minority economic group participation in 
projects; stimulatation of the local industry base, etc.) whilst also yielding competitive power prices via 
auction.    
Table 3: Summary of the South African RE auction programme 
Topic / Aspect Description 
Description of when 
RES auctions were 
initiated, how many 
undertaken so far, 
which technologies 
South Africa’s RE Independent Power Procurement Programme (REIPPP) has 
conducted four competitive auctions (known as bidding windows, BW) for 
independent power producers (IPP) RE projects since 2011.7 The most recent 
bidding window (BW 4(b)) was implemented in 2015. 
The auctions are technology specific. Technology specific capacity limits are 
set for each BW tender. The largest capacity allocations were for wind power 
and solar PV, with smaller capacity limits set for CSP, biomass, biogas, landfill 
gas, and hydropower.   
High level description 
of the results of the 
102 IPP projects, comprising 6400 MW of RE capacity, have been procured 
from four bidding round windows with further windows expected to be 
                                                             
7 BW 1(2011), BW2 (2012), BW3 (2013), BW3.5 (2014), and BW4(a) (2014) and BW4(b) (2015).  
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most recent auction  announced in the future.  
Any outstanding or 
unique characteristics 
of the auction 
programme / DEs to 
mention  
Besides the main objective to secure electrical energy from the private sector 
via RE sources to add to the national grid, the programme and the auctions itself 
are also structured to contribute to broader national development objectives, 
such as job creation, social inclusion, as well as a broadening of economic 
ownership. 
Market concentration 
as measured through 
the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI)  
Solar 
PV 
The market concentration has increased over the course of the 4 
bidding windows.  
HHI Solar PV BW1: 1025 
HHI Solar PV BW2: 1850 
HHI Solar PV BW3: 2747 
HHI Solar PV BW3.5: 10000 
HHI Solar PV BW4: 3364 
Wind 
power 
The market concentration has remained mostly stable over the 
course of the first 3 bidding windows, but has increased significantly 
in the last bidding window:  
HHI Wind BW1: 1563 
HHI Wind BW2: 1871 
HHI Wind BW3: 1724 
HHI Wind BW4: 3142 
CSP The market concentration for CSP over the course of the four bidding 
windows has remained unchanged at 10000, due to the fact that the 
auction has been a single item auction. 
 
2.5.3 Spain 
Spain is a high-income country located in south-west Europe and with a population of around 47 million. It is 
a world leader in terms of the integration of variable RE, and it has a diversified electricity generation mix 
comprised mainly of wind, solar PV, natural gas fired plant, nuclear, hydropower, and negligible levels of coal 
fired power.     
Spain has tracked a pathbreaking and frenetic pathway with RE so far. It was an early leader in renewables 
and was broadly considered to be one of the most attractive markets in the world to invest in solar PV, wind 
power and CSP projects in the mid-late 2000s.  
Prior to its first RE auction (in 2016), Spain had significant experience in the use of administratively-set 
remuneration for RE generation through a FiT/FIP system. The administratively-set remuneration system 
was initially introduced in 1998 (and modified in 2004 and 2007). As a result of FiT conditions that were 
widely interpreted as attractive in the international context, a large wind and solar power industrial base 
quickly built up in Spain in the 2000s, and investment levels were high.  
However, from 2010 onwards, a series of significant (and sometimes retroactive) changes to the FiT system 
were made, before the system was discontinued for any new projects. It is worth mentioning that this major 
change in the outlook of Spain’s RE sector had severe negative impacts on the solar and wind energy 
industrial bases that had been built up in the preceding 15 years or so. A period then followed during which 
no investments were made in new RE projects, before Spain’s RE auction programme was initiated. Since 
the uptake of the auction programme (the key details of which are summarised in Table 4), investments in 
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new RE generation capacity have grown markedly. Spain has set itself the target of significantly scaling up 
renewable generation capacity, achieving a 74% share of RE in the generation mix8 by 2030 (up from around 
49% at the end of 2019).9       
Firstly, it is important to take into account the Spanish energy context in which auctions were adopted in 
2016 and 2017 (see del Río 2017b for further details). Spain is essentially an electricity island with limited 
interconnections with other countries and with electricity generation overcapacity. It has a comparatively 
high penetration of RE and during the first years of this decade was on track to meet its 2020 RE targets.10 
Retail electricity prices are higher than the EU average, coupled with a deep economic crisis, a chronic 
electricity system tariff deficit, a perceived large increase in the costs of RE support and sluggish electricity 
demand (resulting from the economic crisis) led the then central Spanish government to stop financial 
support for new RE installations in 2012. Between 2012 and 2015, new RE capacity additions were very 
limited, representing around just 3% of the total installed capacity in 2015. However, from 2014 onwards 
economic growth started to recover (3.84% GDP growth rate in 2015) and this pushed energy demand 
upwards. Together with the difficulties of incorporating RE into the non-electricity sectors (transport and 
heating/cooling), this led the government to be concerned about the country’s ability to reach its 2020 RE 
target. Therefore, two “pilot” auctions, both with relatively low volumes (200 MW for biomass and 500 MW 
for wind), were organized in 2015, and took place in 2016, followed by two larger auctions in 2017. 
On the other hand, Spain has quite a complete wind supply chain, with a presence of firms in all its stages, 
from project development to equipment manufacturing and O&M. 
Table 4: Summary of the Spanish RE auction programme 
Topic / Aspect Description 
Description of when 
RES auctions were 
initiated, how many 
undertaken so far, 
which technologies 
After several years without new renewable electricity installations being 
supported, three auctions were organized between 2016 and 2017 in Spain. 
Overall, more than 8 GW were awarded via these auctions.  
The three auctions differ with respect to their technology-neutrality/specificity. 
The first auction took place in January 2016. It was a technology specific 
auction, so in reality two separate auctions took place: one for biomass (with a 
volume of 200 MW) and another one for wind (500 MW). The second auction 
(May 2017) was technology-neutral in the sense that all technologies were 
eligible to participate in it (but it included some design elements which 
favoured wind over PV). 3000 MW were awarded. The third auction (July 
2017) was multi-technology, since only wind and PV could participate. 5037 
MW were awarded (see del Río 2017b and 2018 for further details). 
High level description 
of the results of the 
most recent auction  
In the 2nd auction, 2979 MW were awarded to wind, with PV being awarded 
only 1 MW and other technologies accounting for the rest. 
In total, 5037 MW were awarded in the third auction, 77% went to PV (3909 
MW) and 23% to wind (1128 MW). 
All winning bidders in the 3rd auction bid for the maximum discount allowed. 
The government decided that all the bids which offered the maximum 
discount would be awarded contracts. The result for all of them is zero 
remuneration for the investment (Rinv). The discounts “will guarantee that the 
energy produced will be remunerated at market prices (…), without an 
                                                             
8 MITECO, 2020. Integrated Energy and Climate Change Plan. Received from: 
https://www.miteco.gob.es/images/es/pnieccompleto_tcm30-508410.pdf  
9 Red Eléctrica España, 2019. Spain closes 2019 with 10% more installed renewable power capacity. Received from: 
https://www.ree.es/en/press-office/news/press-release/2019/12/spain-closes-2019-10-more-installed-renewable-
power-capacity 
10 Spanish RES target for 2020 is 20%. In 2014, RES penetration was 17.3%, versus the expected indicative RES Directive 
trajectory (2-year averages) for 2013-2014, which was 12.1%.  
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additional premium being provided by the electricity system in the central 
scenarios of pool electricity prices” (MINETAD Press note on July 26th 2017). 
Beneficiaries will receive compensation (Rinv) only if, in the coming years, the 
wholesale electricity price drops to a very low level in order to recover the 
investment (remaining after the discount in the third auction). See del Río 
2018 for further details. 
Any outstanding or 
unique characteristics 
of the auction 
programme / DEs to 
mention  
The design of these auctions has been deemed complex and they certainly 
are very different to those being organized in other countries (see del Río 
2017b).  
In the Spanish auctions, plants producing electricity from RE sources would 
receive the market price plus a “specific complementary remuneration” (Rinv). 
The Rinv is a payment per kW that allows installations to recover those 
investment costs which cannot be recovered by the sale of electricity in the 
market. Each installation receives the market price plus the Rinv of the plant 
type taking into account that a “reasonable profitability level” cannot be 
exceeded. 
Market concentration 
as measured through 
the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI)  
Solar PV No specific auction for PV 
Wind 
power 
No specific auction for wind. 
The market concentration for successive auctions has decreased 
over time, an inverse relationship with the higher volumes over 
time. The respective HHI for bidders these auctions have been: 
HHI 1st auction (wind, January 2016): 4364 
HHI 1st auction (biomass, January 2016): 3966 
HHI 2nd auction (technology-neutral, mostly wind awarded May 
2017): 2853 
HHI 3rd auction (multi-technology, only for wind and PV, mostly PV 
awarded, July 2017): 1422 
 
2.5.4 United Kingdom  
The UK is located in northern Europe, between the Atlantic Ocean to the west and the North Sea to the East; 
and enjoys significant wind resources throughout the extension of the island and especially in its coastal and 
offshore regions.   
In 2019, the power generation mix in the UK was dominated by natural gas fired plant (33%), nuclear power 
(14%), and wind and solar energy (21%). The country has a clear goal of scaling up its RE sector and 
decarbonising its power and other key economic sectors through the switch to the use of RE (electricity). 
Auctions for UK offshore wind project development were introduced in 2015.  
The UK’s offshore wind sector has matured rapidly over the past few years. This is a relatively new 
development in terms of the UK’s experience with RE. Until recently, successive governments’ focus was 
primarily on onshore wind, plus solar energy and hydropower.   
In 2019-2020, the UK is now a world leader in offshore wind, with the highest level of installed offshore wind 
power generation capacity of any country. It is also something of a pioneer in terms of the size and power 
rating of the offshore wind farms, and a robust and extensive offshore wind supply chain now exists in the 
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Table 5: Summary of the UK offshore wind RE auction programme 
Topic / Aspect Description 
Description of when 
RES auctions were 
initiated, how many 
undertaken so far, 
which technologies 
The UK has been a frontrunner in the use of RES auctions. From early 
experiences with the Non Fossil-Fuel Obligation (NFFO) auctions in the 1990s 
to the current auction system, first announced in 2011, the use of competitive 
allocation mechanisms has been central to the UK’s approach to supporting 
new renewable electricity generation projects. 
To-date, three auctions have been held under the current system. The original 
policy objectives of the CfD auctions for renewables were primarily to 
introduce competition among technologies of similar maturity. Technologies 
are divided into 2 ‘Pots’ according to their technological maturity. Pot 1 is for 
established technologies, Pot 2 for less established technologies. There is an 
additional pot (Pot 3) for biomass conversion which has not been included in 
any auction to date. 
There have been some slight amendments in the requirements for 
technologies eligible for auctions, particularly the requirement for CHP (or not) 
in Pot 2 projects. AR3 includes a new category of Remote Island Wind, an 
exception to the policy that there should be no further subsidies for onshore 
wind. 
The 2015 Auction (AR1) was for Pots 1 and 2 and covered: 
Pot 1: Onshore wind (>5MW), solar PV >5MW, Energy from Waste with CHP, 
Hydro >5MW and <50MW, Landfill Gas, Sewage Gas 
Pot 2: Offshore wind, Tidal Stream, Wave, ACT with or without CHP, Anaerobic 
Digestion with or without CHP >5MW, Dedicated Biomass with CHP, 
Geothermal with or without CHP 
The 2017 Auction (AR2) was for Pot 2 technologies only: 
Offshore Wind, ACT with or without CHP, Anaerobic Digestion with or without 
CHP, Dedicated Biomass with CHP, Wave, Tidal Stream, Geothermal with or 
without CHP 
The 2019 Auction (AR3) was also for Pot 2 technologies only: 
ACTs, Anaerobic Digestion >5MW, Dedicated Biomass with CHP, Geothermal, 
Offshore wind, Remote Island Wind >5MW, Tidal Stream, Wave. 
High level description 
of the results of the 
most recent auction  
The outturn prices are considered low with the third auction clearing at 
approximately £40/MWh (€44.96) for projects delivered between 2023 and 
2025.  
A striking feature of the results is the success of offshore wind projects in 
capturing the limited budget. Overall, 87% (almost 10GW) of the capacity 
offered contracts in the first three rounds was to offshore wind projects 
(Woodman and Fitch-Roy, 2019) 
Any outstanding or 
unique characteristics 
of the auction 
programme / DEs to 
mention  
The UK CfD auction system is relatively complex, which may be a barrier to 
smaller market actors. Also notable is the high degree of discretion over 
technology outcomes afforded to policymakers by the ‘pot’ system.  
Market concentration 




 AR1 (2014/15) (2 projects; 4 owners) – HHI 2707 
 AR2 (2017) (3 projects; 8 owners) – HHI 2552  
 AR3 (2019) (4 projects; 5 owners) – HHI 3128  
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 AR1 (1 supplier) – HHI 10,000 
 AR2 (2 suppliers) – HHI 5088 
 AR3 (≥3 suppliers) – HHI 5062-5091  
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3 Methodology 
3.1 Expert Elicitations 
In order to get an in-depth and up-to-date understanding of how auctions and their DEs influence project 
developers and component manufacturers, country and technology level case studies were undertaken 
based on structured interviews with key experts in the respective countries.  
Expert elicitation-based interviews were used, given the difficulty to gain representative samples on 
developers and equipment manufacturers (an issue that effectively ruled out the possibility of using a large 
multivariate sample methodological approach). In addition, surveys are more data-intensive, require a greater 
length of time and there is a much higher risk of non-response than compared with the use of expert 
elicitations.  
The interviewed experts were selected based on their being very well-acquainted with the country level 
auction programme, and their significant knowledge of the value chain (particularly as regards project 
developers and component manufacturers). The selected experts came from a broad range of backgrounds. 
These included, for instance, policy makers, energy sector and market experts, stakeholders from financial 
institutions that regularly invest in RE projects, RE industry association representatives, and other relevant 
actors. Central to the success of expert elicitation methodologies is to have a high-quality sample of high 
diversity of experts, while the actual sample size is less relevant. The following box briefly describes the 
expert elicitation method (see del Río and Kiefer 2018 for further details). 
Box 1: A short description of the expert elicitation process, based on del Río and Kiefer (2018) 
Expert elicitations are a proven method when the research interest does not focus on a defined target 
universe, i.e., usually proxied by representative individual observations that are extrapolated to that 
universe, but rather when the aim is to capture a body of knowledge (Chan et al., 2011; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974), usually closely related to a specific technology paired with high technological 
uncertainty. 
In recollecting knowledge and assessing probabilistic estimations about uncertain quantities, expert 
elicitations are fundamentally different from other survey types. Thus, they have to follow a strict and 
robust protocol to ensure uncovering the experts’ deep information which is not available elsewhere whilst 
minimizing potential biases. Robust expert elicitation protocols harness principles from decision theory, 
risk analysis, psychology, statistics and economics (Cooke, 1991; Hogarth, 1987) to counteract several 
biases and heuristics (see Table 6). 
Table 6: Description of biases and heuristics in expert elicitation protocols 
Bias / heuristic Description 
Availability heuristic Greater weights are attributed to events with higher visibility and 
therefore more easily memorable 
Anchoring heuristic Previous known values are only adjusted instead of performing 
independent estimations. 
Representativeness heuristic Separate events, that look “similar”, are treated as symmetrically 
conditional. 
Control heuristic It is assumed to have a minimum level of control or influence over all 
(future) events.  
Base-rate fallacy Case-specific information is attributed more importance than 
“general” or base-rate information, leading to conclusion of 
uniqueness of each event. 
Overconfidence More optimistic estimations due to heightened confidence. 
Egocentric attribution Behavioural choices of the group an expert belongs to are considered 
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to be more common than alternative choices.  
Motivational bias Intentional change of answers in order to influence the studies 
outcome. 
Source: Own elaboration from (Kahneman & Tversky 1984; Durbach et al. 2017; Keeney & Von 
Winterfeldt 1991; Cooke 1991a; Ross & Anderson 1982; Cooke 1991b; Baker & Keisler 2011; Bistline 
2014; Hultman & Koomey 2007) 
In order to achieve maximum robustness and minimize biases, state-of-the-art debiasing strategies should 
be employed during the elicitation (Fischhoff, 1984; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). All experts should receive 
a brief formation session on potential biases and be asked to self-assess their level of expertise. The 
specific purpose of the study needs to be explained and any questions or reservations should be taken 
into account. It is recommended to ensure confidentiality. The experts are asked to expand their 
information and assumptions and explain their reasoning and thoughts in addition to giving a numerical 
answer. Any potential inconsistencies in answers (both between the same interviewee or between different 
ones) should be pointed at and resolved with the expert. Also, answers should be validated and corrected 
for non-regressiveness. After the elicitation, the outcome of the studies should be checked for motivational 
influence. 
The choice of experts in this approach is critical. They need to be representative actors in the entire 
technology value chain who are active around the technology. The experts should be selected based on 
hard criteria in their corresponding reference class: academia, industry, policy makers and thought 
leaders/other indirect stakeholders.  
No hard rules on the optimum number of experts exist. Whereas additional experts increase the diversity 
of judgement, their marginal usefulness decreases. Almost all past expert elicitations have a range of 6 to 
12 experts. Right after each elicitation, the analysts should proceed to post-elicitation, including 
highlighting the most important aspects, detection of confirmation or contradiction with other experts 
previously elicited, and transcription of the main judgements by the expert. 
Source: Based on del Río and Kiefer (2018) 
3.1.1 Operationalization of the Concept of Market Concentration 
Market (or industry) is the degree to which production in an industry is dominated by a few large firms 
(Shughart 2019). According to OECD (2018), “market concentration measures the extent to which market 
shares are concentrated between a small number of firms”. The concentration of markets is measured in 
different ways. Concentration ratios (i.e., the total share of the 3, 4, or 10 companies with the largest share) 
and the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) are the standard tools of competition economists and competition 
authorities to measure market concentration.  
As previously mentioned, market concentration, as operationalized in this study, has two main aspects which 
are relevant in the context of this report: (i) the number of firms in a given sector (market) of interest, and (ii) 
the diversity of those firms. Diversity refers to the relative distribution of the market between small, medium 
and large-scale market players. This approach corresponds to two approaches in the analysis of market 
concentration in Industrial Economics: 
I. The deterministic approach (number of firms): The simplest version of the standard perfect 
competition model considers the number of firms as the basic variable which determines the type 
of market structure. As the number of firms in a market goes down, cæteris paribus, market 
concentration increases. From the perspective of an explanation based on economies of scale, this 
is the basic factor which better expresses the evolution of MC.  
II. The stochastic view (heterogeneity of firms): In contrast, the stochastic perspective suggests that the 
heterogeneity of firms is the crucial aspect which is behind changes in MC. However, compared to 
the identification of the number of firms (point 1 above), determining the degree of similarity of the 
firms which make up a market is more difficult (Furió and Alonso 2008). 
Given the complexity of expert elicitation processes and the challenging requirements on participants who 
respond to them, the simplified operationalization of market concentration through the limitation of the 
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concept to only represent the number and diversity of firms, was found to be sensible.  
3.1.2 Elicitation Protocol 
The survey design follows a structure standardized across all technologies and value chain phases (project 
developers and component manufacturers). Each question form had three sections, and for each question, 
the expert was asked to provide both closed (explicit / quantitative) and open (qualitative) answers: 
I. Assessment of the number and diversity and self-assessment: The experts were asked to provide an 
assessment of the current status of market concentration and actor diversity in simplified terms. 
Where hard data is available, this question also served to assess the expert’s level of expertise. 
Furthermore, self-assessment questions were used, where the expert assessed their level of 
knowledge with respect to auction DEs, the specific auction of the country case, as well as regarding 
the respective technology’s project developers and component manufacturers. A Likert scale was 
used to record the expert’s responses. 
II. Assessment of Context: The expert was asked to estimate the impact of specific contextual factors 
on the number and diversity of project developers and component manufacturers. The context 
conditions analyzed comprised: 
a. Policy framework conditions in the country of interest (ambitious targets, policy stability). 
b. Broader policies (energy, industrial development and environmental) in the country of 
interest or in other countries.  
c. Socioeconomic conditions in the country of interest (i.e. the existence of an industry, 
capabilities in the country, resources, etc.). 
d. Context factors in the country of interest (investment climate in the country, size of the 
market, availability of transmission/distribution infrastructure, RE resource potentials, 
financing costs, installation and building costs, ease of access to equipment). 
A Likert scale was used to record the expert’s responses, ranging from 0-10. 
III. Assessment of Auction and DEs: The experts were asked to assess the strength and direction of 
impacts of the auction in general, as well as for 12 DEs, on the number and diversity of project 
developers and component manufacturers. A Likert scale was used to record the expert’s responses, 
ranging from 0-10. 
3.1.3 Choice of Experts 
The choice of experts for the implementation of robust expert elicitation methodology is vital. More important 
than the quantity of experts is their quality and diversity. A shortlist of highly qualified and diverse experts 
was contacted in each of the 4 case countries, of which between five and 12 experts have participated in the 
expert elicitation process per country. The selection of experts represented a largely balanced distribution of 
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Figure 7: Overview on sectoral background and technology focus of interviewed experts 
 
Source: Own elaboration (2020) 
In order to establish a metric that could be used to evaluate the quality of different experts’ responses, self-
assessment questions were used in the survey. As can be seen in Figure 8,11 the interviewed experts self-
assessed themselves and reported having a high level of knowledge on country-specific project developers 
and component manufacturers, on RE auctions in general, as well as on the specific auction scheme in the 
respective countries. 
Broadly speaking, the interviewed experts consider that they have a more solid understanding of the specific 
RE auction programme in their respective country of focus, as compared with their understanding of auctions 
in general (internationally). This is primarily due to their having worked intensely in their country’s RE sector, 
with only some of the experts having worked in, and actively tracked, developments in the broader 









                                                             
11 The upper and lower edges of the box correspond to the first and third quartiles (the 25th and 75th percentiles). The 
upper whisker extends from the box to the highest value that is within 1.5 * IQR of the box, where IQR is the interquartile 
range, or distance between the first and third quartiles. The lower whisker extends from the box to the lowest value within 
1.5 * IQR of the box. Data beyond the end of the whiskers are outliers and plotted as points. 
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Figure 8: Results – expert self-assessment   
 
Source: Own elaboration (2020) 
The quality of experts’ judgements was further evaluated through the use of calibration questions. 
Judgements were recorded on the perceived number and diversity of project developers and component 
manufacturers, respectively, for each country case. The analytical approach used gave equal weighting to all 
experts’ responses. 
Generally, the perceptions on the number of developers and manufacturers were found to differ substantially 
amongst the experts (high variance) in some countries (e.g., Peru or South Africa), while the experts’ 
perceptions on the degree of diversity of project developers and component manufacturers were found to 
be more aligned. This is interesting, given that some of the interviewed experts explained that they generally 
found it more straightforward to estimate the numbers of project developers and component manufacturers, 
as compared to estimating the level of actor diversity amongst firms. 
These estimations of the number and diversity of project developers and component manufacturers were 
compared to true data as obtained from official auction statistics subsequent to the interview, and were 
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Figure 9: Perceived number and diversity of component manufacturers and project developers 
 
Source: Own elaboration (2020) 
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4 Case Country Results  
4.1 Peru 
4.1.1 The Impact of Auctions and Specific Design Elements in Peru 
Figure 10 reflects the distribution of experts’ perceptions on the impact of Peru’s fourth RE auction on the 
number and diversity of project developers and component manufacturers, as compared to a hypothetical 
counterfactual assuming the existence of administratively set remuneration support system. 
Figure 10: The Full Impact of Auctions on the Number and Diversity of Developers and Manufacturers in Peru 
 
Source: Own elaboration (2020) 
Figure 11 provides an overview of experts’ estimates of the impact of the 12 auction DEs analysed in the 
Peruvian auction on the number and diversity of project developers and component manufacturers. 
Additionally, an aggregated response comprising the combination of all design element-related responses is 
presented, i.e., Aggregated Response, that is an unweighted aggregation of estimated direction and strength 
indicated across all analysed DEs in the country.  
The estimated full impact of the auction on both the number and diversity of project developers and 
component manufacturers peaks around the “neutral” level in Figure 11. At the same time, some experts see 
the number of project developers and component manufacturers to be positively impacted by the current 
auction scheme, while judgments diverge on the direction of impact of the scheme on the diversity of 
developers and manufacturers. These perceptions on the overall impact of the auction scheme as compared 
to a hypothetical counterfactual based on administratively set support is reflected by the aggregation of the 
estimated impacts of isolated DEs (see the last row of Figure 11), in that the perceived impact on the number 
and diversity of project developers and component manufacturers is confirmed to largely peak at the neutral 
or balance across the full spectrum.  
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Figure 11: The Perceived Impact of Design Elements on Number and Diversity in Peru 
 
Source: Own elaboration (2020) 
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Prequalification Requirements: The number of project developers is perceived to be affected both positively 
and negatively, in equal proportion, by stringent material prequalification requirements on the project and the 
bidder, as well as by stringent financial prequalification requirements.  
The impact of prequalification requirements on the number of component manufacturers is also considered 
to be relatively neutral, except for in the presence of stringent financial prequalification requirements, where 
some experts tend to see positive impacts on the number of manufacturers.  
All types of prequalification requirements are perceived to decrease the diversity of project developers, with 
project material prequalification requirements potentially having the strongest impact. A similar trend is 
observed for component manufacturers, for whom the prequalification requirements on bidders and 
stringent financial prequalification requirements are perceived to reduce diversity. 
Technological Neutrality: The average view of experts is that the fact that an auction is technologically neutral 
is of little influence on both the number and diversity of project developers and component manufacturers. 
Nonetheless, some experts expressed the view that technological neutrality can reduce the number of project 
developers and component manufacturers, and a positive impact on the diversity of project developers. 
Project Size Limitations: There seems to be little consensus on the direction of the impact of maximum 
project size limitations on the number of project developers, with recorded responses ranging across the full 
spectrum of possible responses. For component manufacturers, on the other hand, there is strong 
consensus that maximum project size limitations are of little relevance to the number of firms. 
The impact of maximum project size limitations on the diversity of project developers and component 
manufacturers is perceived to be very similar, with the average responses peaking just left of the neutral 
(slightly negative perceived impact on diversity). 
Minimum project size limitations are also perceived to not significantly affect the number of component 
manufacturers, but experts generally believe that such size limitations will slightly decrease the number of 
project developers. 
The impact of minimum project size limitations, on the other hand, have no clear impact on the diversity of 
project developers, with recorded responses indicative of both positive and negative impacts. Component 
manufacturers, however, are perceived to be less significantly affected by minimum project size limitations.  
Schedule and Frequency: The impact of having a transparent auction schedule, as well as a high frequency 
of auctions, was perceived to significantly increase both the number and diversity of project developers and 
component manufacturers, albeit less strongly in the case of the latter. One expert, however, has indicated 
his conviction that a transparent auction schedule may strongly reduce the number of project developers 
and component manufacturers. 
Price-Only, Uniform & Renumeration Type: With only minor deviations, the perceived impact of conducting 
price-only auctions with uniform pricing rules and a FiT based renumeration type on the number and diversity 
of component manufacturers was recorded to be very marginal.  
Responses were much more varied concerning the impact of these three DEs on the number and diversity of 
project developers. Experts indicated that price-only auctions can be associated with positive and negative 
impacts on both the number and diversity of project developers. A similarly balanced response pattern was 
recorded for the impact of uniform pricing rules. Also, the impact of FiT based renumeration types was 
perceived as variable but skewed to the left (negative impact). 
Realization period: With respect to the impact of long (>4 year) realization periods on the number of 
developers and manufacturers, experts’ judgments again are widely varied.  
The diversity of developers and manufacturers is perceived to be impacted more distinctively by provisions 
for extended realization periods, with both stages of the value chain being perceived to be on average 
negatively impacted by this design element.  
4.1.2 Discussion of Expert Responses 
In general terms the experts’ responses were roughly in line with expectations as regards the central 
hypothesis of the study.  
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It is worth mentioning that no consensus was achieved as regards the impact of certain DEs on MC, for 
instance, (strict) prequalification requirements on bidders and financial prequalification requirements. This 
is slightly surprising, as one might expect that the use of strict prequalification requirements would tend to 
make it harder for smaller size actors to get a foothold in the market and compete in auctions. As concerns 
the perceived impact of strict prequalification requirements on bidders and strict financial prequalification 
requirements, there were lower levels of consensus concerning the impact on MC in the project developer 
stage of the value chain, as compared within the component manufacturer stage.   
The majority of DEs are perceived to impact the MC of project developers and component manufacturers in 
generally similar ways. But it is typically the case that the impact on the project developer value chain stage 
are perceived to be more acute, whereas the impacts on component manufacturers are somewhat 
dampened by comparison. Perhaps the most exemplary case is that of the use of price-only auctions (as 
compared to multi-criteria auctions). In that instance, MC in the project developer stage is expected to be 
significantly increased, whereas the overall effect on MC in the component developer stage is relatively 
neutral.   
The trend of DEs affecting MC in the project developer value chain stage to a greater extent than for 
component manufacturers is quite in line with expectations. Component manufacturers may be more 
shielded from the direct effects of DEs, being further upstream in the value chain. It is also worth noting that 
Peru’s RE sector is in a relatively nascent stage of its development, and as one interviewed expert pointed 
out, the country “has not yet developed a robust and competitive RE component manufacturing sector: 
components used in RE projects in Peru are all sourced from the international market.” 
One DE that is clearly perceived to reduce the number of project developers in the market is the use of 
minimum project sizes. This is as expected, given that broadly speaking smaller scale project developers do 
not have access to the same financial and human resources required to develop large scale projects, and 
may therefore be effectively shut out of the auction. Smaller scale actors do not typically have the same 
access to capital from lending institutions and are unable to spread their investment risks over as broad a 
portfolio as those of larger scale actors. The perceived impact of minimum project sizes on the number of 
component manufacturers, however, was perceived to neutral overall.  
Overall, the two DEs perceived to induce the greatest increases in the diversity of project developers and 
component manufacturers were the existence of a (publicly disclosed) auction schedule and a high 
frequency of auctions. Several experts commented that actors within Peru’s RE sector crave, more than 
anything else, stability and guarantees of the existence of a medium- to long-term market.    
The use of relatively long realization periods is understood to increase the number of both project developers 
and component manufacturers. However, somewhat surprisingly, experts perceived that long realization 
periods would tend to reduce the level of diversity in both value chain stages. In other words, smaller sized 
actors would struggle to compete and win in auctions with longer realization periods. As one expert pointed 
out, during the country’s initial auction, the realization period was “set too short and there was a high level of 
non-realization of projects within the set realization period.”  
Finally, looking at the aggregated response, interviewed experts were in broader agreement concerning the 
overall impact of the 12 DEs on MC of component manufacturers, as compared with the case for project 
developers. A broad spectrum of views exists concerning the aggregate effect of the 12 considered DEs on 
MC of project developers. Given that Peru’s solar PV and wind power sectors were initiated through the use 
of RE auctions (i.e. there was no preceding FiT system operating prior to the use of auctions), as well as the 
country’s relatively limited experience in using auctions, it may be the case that clear conclusions are difficult 
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4.2 Spain 
4.2.1 The Impact of Auctions and Specific Design Elements in Spain 
Figure 12 shows the distribution of experts’ perceptions on the impact of Spain's third RE auction on the 
number and diversity of project developers and component manufacturers, as compared to the previous 
administratively set remuneration support system in place in Spain.12  
Figure 12: The Full Impact of Auctions on the Number and Diversity of Developers and Manufacturers in Spain 
 
Source: Own elaboration (2020) 
The results of the interviews of experts on their perception of the influence of different auction DEs on the 
number and diversity of firms, in the Spanish context, both with respect to project developers and component 
manufacturers, is provided in Figure 13. 
 
                                                             
12 Specifically, this was the FiT/FiP-based remuneration system that was in effect in Spain between 2004 and 2007 
(established by Royal Decree 436/2004) and between 2007 and 2011 (established by Royal Decree 661/2007).  
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Figure 13: The Perceived Impact of Design Elements on Number and Diversity in Spain  
 
Source: Own elaboration (2020) 
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Prequalification Requirements: As expected, both the number and diversity of actors are perceived to be 
negatively affected by stringent prequalification requirements (compared to lenient ones). This is the case 
with respect to, both, project developers and manufacturers. However, a major finding is that the impact is 
greater on project developers than on the latter actors, suggesting that the impact of the design of the auction 
on actors in the value chain vanishes as we move upstream such value chain. Our results also indicate that 
not all types of prequalification requirements are perceived to have the same effect. Regarding project 
developers, material prequalification requirements on the project are considered to discourage less the 
number of project developers than the other two types (material prequalification requirements on the bidders 
and financial prequalification requirements). In contrast, material prequalification requirements on the 
project are perceived to have a greater impact on the diversity of firms than the other two types of 
prequalification requirements.  In the case of manufacturers, most interviewees do not see a relevant impact 
(neither positive nor negative) of prequalification requirements on the number of manufacturers. This is the 
case for all types of prequalification requirements, and major differences cannot be observed in the regard, 
with the possible exception of financial prequalification requirements, which have a slightly more negative 
effect on the number of firms than the other prequalification requirements. In contrast to their small impact 
on the number of firms, all the prequalification requirements are perceived to negatively affect actor diversity, 
with very small differences across them.     
Technological Neutrality: The results show a slightly negative perceived impact of technology-neutral 
auctions on the number of firms compared to technology-specific ones. This is the case for both project 
developers and manufacturers, and significant differences on these two types of actors cannot be observed. 
The negative impact on actor diversity is similar to the impact on the number of firms, and both for project 
developers and manufacturers. Nevertheless, some interviews perceive a positive impact on both types of 
actors, and also on the number of firms, suggesting that there is less agreement on the direction of the 
perceived influence than with the previous design element.  
Project Size Limitations: Restrictions on the maximum and minimum size of projects which can be awarded 
in the auction can be expected to affect the number of firms and their diversity. However, experts do not 
perceive a major impact with respect to maximum project limits. Somehow unexpectedly there is a lack of 
agreement on their effects on the number and diversity of both project developers and manufacturers, with 
a wide distribution of interviewees’ responses. In contrast, the impact of minimum size restrictions is strong, 
and of a negative sign. This is particularly so concerning the number of firms (especially for project 
developers), but a negative impact of minimum size limitations on actor diversity can also be discerned 
according to the perception of the interviewees, particularly for project developers as well. The softer effects 
on manufacturers could be expected.      
Schedule and Frequency: These are two DEs with the strongest perceived impact both on the number of firms 
and actor diversity and for both types of actors considered in this study. Particularly, the existence of a 
schedule is regarded to have more positive effects (on the number of firms and actor diversity) for project 
developers compared to manufacturers. A similar conclusion can be drawn with respect to highly frequent 
auctions, which are perceived to increase the number of firms and actor diversity, with stronger effects on 
project developers than manufacturers.  
Price-Only, Uniform & Renumeration Type: In contrast to the previous design element, it is not straightforward 
to draw clear conclusions on the influence of price-only auctions on the numbers of project developers and 
component manufacturers (compared to multicriteria ones) The picture is balanced: Some experts foresee 
a positive impact of price-only auctions on the number of actors, but others see a negative one. The influence 
of price-only auctions on actor diversity is mostly regarded as neutral, both with respect to project developers 
and manufacturers. A similar picture emerges in the case of uniform pricing vs. price as bid (PAB). There isn’t 
an agreement among experts on the direction of influence of uniform pricing on the number of actors (neither 
with respect to project developers nor manufacturers). And their perception on the effects on actor diversity 
are mostly neutral, i.e., no influence, neither on the number of firms nor on actor diversity. Finally, a clear 
perceived positive impact on the number of firms of FiT (vs. Feed-in Premium (FiP)) can be observed, 
especially on project developers, and less so on manufacturers. This is also the case with the impact of FiTs 
on actor diversity. FiTs are perceived to increase actor diversity, especially for project developers.  
Realization periods: As reported by the experts, realization periods of above 4 years positively affect the 
number and diversity of firms. This is especially so for project developers. The expected influence on 
manufacturers is lower. 
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4.2.2 Discussion of Expert Responses 
The expert responses in the Spanish case are broadly as expected, with some exceptions. In some cases, 
there isn’t an agreement between the interviewees on the direction of the influence of a given design element 
on the number of firms and actor diversity. In other cases, the effects are regarded as neutral. 
The results show that the direction of the impact of a given design element on the number of firms and actor 
diversity is similar for project developers and manufacturers. One interviewee argues that one of the reasons 
for the similar impact is related to “verticalisation”. “This is a main feature of this sector in Spain. The project 
developer is a vertical one, e.g., it has backward linkages in the value chain, particularly, with manufacturers”. 
However, our results also show that the perceived impact is lower for manufacturers than for project 
developers. This confirms our expectation that the effects of a given design element in the auctions loses 
importance as we move upstream in the value chain.  
On the other hand, it is interesting to note that, for a given design element (and a given actor), there is not 
much difference regarding the direction and extent of the perceived influence between the effects on the 
number of firms and actor diversity. In general, a slightly greater impact on actor diversity than on the number 
of firms can be observed. 
Regarding project developers, the existence of a schedule seems to have a large perceived influence on the 
number and diversity of firms. There is a widespread agreement that a schedule would increase both the 
number of project developers and manufacturers as well as their diversity. According to one interviewee, the 
existence of a schedule “is the most influential design element on the number of firms. You need to know 
that there is a market without ups and downs. This allows continuous planning on the part of the 
manufacturer and the project developer”.  
In contrast, stringent prequalification requirements are perceived to have the largest negative effect on the 
number of firms and the diversity of actors. The direction of the influence is the same for the three types of 
prequalification requirements (material requirements on the project or the bidder and financial 
prequalification requirements). It is interesting to note that they are not only perceived to impact the number 
of firms and their diversity, but also the type of firms that bid in the auction. Several interviewees stress that 
lax prequalification requirements may increase the number of bidders going to the auction, but not 
necessarily the “quality” of those bidders, i.e., encouraging the participation of less “serious” (or weaker ones).  
Size limitations have some effects on project developers, but their impact on manufacturers is generally 
regarded as neutral, both regarding maximum and minimum size limitations. It is surprising to see that the 
existence of a maximum project size does not have a large effect on the diversity of firms. A priori, it could 
be expected that such requirement would encourage projects and actors with smaller sizes. But this is not 
the case. An interesting, although expected finding is that a minimum size limit tends to impact size diversity 
positively, i.e., it encourages smaller actors. The existence of lower or upper size requirement may have 
detrimental effects on the number of firms. This is perceived to clearly be the case for a maximum size. 
However, although the picture is more balanced regarding the existence of a minimum size, some 
interviewees also perceived a negative impact on the number of firms in this regard. For example, one 
interviewee argues that “there would be a lot of people who would not go to the auction if they are required 
to build projects with a small size. In particular, medium-size project developers who would not go to the 
auction if the required size of projects is below 50MW”. 
One of the DEs with the largest impact on the number of firms and actor diversity is the remuneration type 
(FiT vs. FiP). In this case, compared to FiPs, FiTs are perceived as very positive to increase the number of 
firms as well as their diversity, both concerning project developers and equipment manufacturers, although 
with a greater effect on the latter. As mentioned by one interviewee, “investors look at the stability of such 
price rather than the final value of its level. FiTs give more security to investors and, thus, their number of 
firms would increase”. 
Finally, a quite influential design element is a long realization period. They are regarded as very positive to 
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4.3 South Africa 
4.3.1 The Impact of Auctions and Specific Design Elements in South Africa 
Figure 14 shows the distribution of experts’ estimations on what the impact of South Africa’s REIPPP BW 4 
had been on the number and diversity of project developers and component manufacturers. Figure 15 
provides an overview of experts’ perceptions of the impact of 12 auction DEs relevant to the fourth bidding 
window, on the number and diversity of project developers and component manufacturers.  
Figure 14: The Full Impact of Auctions on the Number and Diversity of Developers and Manufacturers in South 
Africa 
 
Source: Own elaboration (2020) 
The estimated full impact of the auction on the number of project developers and component manufacturers 
is largely balanced in Figure 14, however, with some experts reporting extreme positive and negative impacts. 
This is reflected by the aggregation of the estimated impacts of isolated DEs (last row of Figure 15). The 
diversity of project developers was believed to be slightly more negatively affected by the use of auctions (as 
compared to under a hypothetical administratively-set remuneration arrangement), while the impact on the 
diversity of component manufacturers remained neutral (see Figure 15). Interestingly, the degree of negative 
impact on diversity of project developers is more acute than would be anticipated based on the aggregated 
responses (last row of Figure 15.)  
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Figure 15: The Perceived Impact of Design Elements on Number and Diversity in South Africa 
 
Source: Own elaboration (2020) 
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Prequalification Requirements: The number and diversity of project developers is negatively affected by 
stringent material prequalification requirements on the project and the bidder, as well as by stringent financial 
prequalification requirements. The number and diversity of component manufacturers is considered to be 
negatively affected by stringent prequalification requirements, but to a lesser extent than is the case for 
project developers. A similar impact (both project developers, and component manufacturers, respectively) 
is considered to hold for prequalification requirements on bidders. One interviewee commented that South 
Africa’s challenging local content requirements and rules sometimes mean that some projects do not pass 
through the project development stage, thus affecting the number of project developers.     
Technological Neutrality: The impact of technology neutral auctions was perceived to be rather positive on 
both the number and diversity of project developers and component manufacturers. However, interviewees’ 
responses were widely distributed, showing an overall lack of consensus amongst interviewed experts 
regarding the effects of technological neutrality.  
Project Size Limitations: Project size limitations, both minimum and maximum, were found to be largely 
irrelevant in determining the number and diversity of component manufacturers. This is because there is 
likely to be a similar aggregate level of demand for specific technical components, regardless of whether a 
relatively-large number of small-scale projects, or a relatively-low number of large-scale projects are to be 
developed following an auction, and taking into account the modular nature of solar PV and wind power 
projects.    
However, maximum project size limitations were reported to positively affect the number and diversity of 
project developers. Minimum project size limitations are expected to reduce the number of project 
developers (albeit not very significantly). Interviewed experts understand this to be the case because smaller 
project developers struggle to raise the finance required for relatively-large scale investments (with minimum 
project sizes), whereas larger-scale firms can raise the required levels of debt and equity with relative ease. 
Hence, the smaller firms are pushed out of the market, leaving a smaller number of larger-sized firms (i.e. 
lower diversity).   
Schedule and Frequency: It is not straightforward to draw clear conclusions on the relationship between a 
high frequency of auctions or the existence of predefined schedules, respectively, on the numbers of project 
developers and component manufacturers. On average, there is a general tendency to perceive these two 
DEs as positively impacting on the number of project developers and component manufacturers. Regarding 
the diversity of project developers and component manufacturers, the picture is much clearer. Both DEs are 
understood to increase the level of diversity. In particular, the frequency of auctions is expected to create a 
strong impact on the number and diversity of component manufacturers.    
Price-Only, Uniform & Renumeration Type: The impact of price-only auctions, uniform pricing and a FiT 
renumeration type on both the number and diversity of component manufacturers seems to be perceived as 
balanced on average, but with strong variance. With respect to the number of project developers, the three 
DEs were perceived to have a clear positive effect on average.  
Price-only auctions were reported to be more likely to increase both the number and diversity of project 
developers. It is worth noting that South Africa has previously applied multicriteria requirements that project 
developers must comply with, and which are considered to be relatively demanding in the international 
context of RES auctions.  
Realization: Realization periods of above 4 years do not seem to decisively affect the number of project 
developers and component manufacturers, as reported by the experts. While there is no clear agreement 
overall, the use of relatively long realization periods is perceived to hold the potential to increase the diversity 
of both project developers and component manufacturers.  
4.3.2 Discussion of Expert Responses 
In general terms, the findings are overall in line with expectations as regards the hypothesis being scrutinised 
within this analysis. Different DEs do affect MC in different ways, and a broad range of effects shown. Specific 
DEs tend to affect MC in the project development value chain stage to a greater extent than is the case for 
(solar PV, wind power and CSP) component manufacturers.  
Stringent financial prequalification requirements are expected to significantly reduce both the number and 
diversity of project developers. By contrast, the impact on component manufacturers is considered to be 
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relatively neutral. Some interviewees underlined their view that the threshold for what is considered stringent 
or challenging, in terms of financial prequalification requirements, is very much specific to each organization, 
which will have its respective internal decision-making criteria (e.g. organization-specific hurdle rates, etc.).  
With respect to technological neutrality, one interviewee suggested that technology neutral auctions can 
cause a reduction in the number and diversity of component manufacturers because of the uncertainty 
around which RE technologies will win the auction, and hence the level of demand for different technology 
components. Under such conditions, only a few (and large-sized) firms may be able to deal with this 
uncertainty, from a business point of view.   
Some experts suggested that having a clear understanding of the calendar of future auctions is very 
significant because it assists in developing a planning horizon for projects and business decisions. It was 
commented that when there is a lack of clarity on when future auctions will take place, smaller scale firms 
are more likely to stop operating, and to mothball their operations, perhaps re-locating to other international 
markets. The likelihood of this occurring is directly related to the period of time during which there is a lack 
of clarity on the future auction calendar. Amongst other things, some experts considered this to be the case 
because smaller-scale firms with overhead costs and a lack of clarity on future revenues (via sales of 
generated electricity, or components), tend to struggle more than larger-scale firms in their efforts to remain 
financially solvent and to raise capital from lending institutions to maintain their business afloat. One expert 
highlighted that several component manufacturers that were located in South Africa, supplying componentry 
to the solar PV sector, decided to close their South African operations and relocate overseas, specifically due 
to the considerable uncertainty over the timing of future auctions, with planned auctions being cancelled on 
several occasions over a period of years.  
 
However, it is important to note that there is very low consensus on experts’ views on the impact on the 
number of project developers and component manufacturers as a result of the existence of a high frequency 
of auctions (i.e. more than 1 auction per year). This contrasts somewhat with the much higher level of 
consensus in experts’ views of the impact of a high frequency of auctions on the diversity of project 
developers and component manufacturers (i.e. strong increase in diversity).   
Some experts expressed an opinion that whilst the use of multicriteria requirements in South Africa’s most 
recent auction probably resulted in a lower number of project developers participating in the auction 
(compared the hypothetical case of a price-only auction), there was still a satisfactory level of interest and 
participation (from a public policy point of view) and that “auctions have consistently been oversubscribed”, 
thereby showing that the country’s use of multicriteria requirements – which may be considered to be 
relatively progressive in the international context, and demanding on bidders in terms of the criteria they need 
to comply with to qualify – has not had a negative impact on market concentration and competition per se.  
It is perceived that when a FiT remuneration-type system is used (as opposed to a FiP remuneration system), 
the number of project developers is expected to increase, whereas there is likely to be no notable effect on 
the number of component manufacturers. As far as actor diversity is concerned, experts perceive that the 
use of FiT remuneration (as compared to FiP remuneration) will tend to reduce the diversity of project 
developers; the effect on the diversity of component manufacturers is less clear and unanimous. 
Lastly, it is worth highlighting that some experts suggested that realization periods of 4 years duration or 
more are not challenging to comply with. It was commented that the vast majority of project developers, of 
all sizes, would be able to develop and commission their projects within such a timeframe, especially as 
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4.4 United Kingdom 
4.4.1 The Impact of Auctions and Specific Design Elements in the UK 
Figure 16 illustrates the overall impact of auctions on the number and diversity of firms in the UK offshore 
wind market relative to a non-auction counterfactual (such as the preceding Renewables Obligation quota 
scheme). The expert interviews indicate a perception that auctions somewhat reduce the number and 
diversity of actors in project development, with a quite strong indication of a more neutral impact on 
component manufacturers. 
Figure 16: The Full Impact of Auctions on the Number and Diversity of Developers and Manufacturers in the 
UK 
 
Source: Own elaboration (2020) 
Figure 17 provides an overview of experts’ perceptions of the impact of 12 analysed auction DEs, on the 
number and diversity of project developers and component manufacturers. 
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Figure 17: The Perceived Impact of Design Elements on Number and Diversity in the UK 
 
Source: Own elaboration (2020) 
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Prequalification Requirements:  
Figure 17 shows a general perception that prequalification requirements on projects, bidders and financial 
penalties all reduce the number of market participants, particularly in project development to a similar degree. 
The perceived impact on actor diversity is also generally negative, indicating that respondents tend to view 
such requirements as a barrier to market entry. However, the effect on diversity shows greater variance than 
the effect on the number of firms, with some respondents reporting a mildly positive effect. 
Technological Neutrality: 
The effect of enabling competition between technologies is perceived by interviewees to reduce the number 
of participants in both project development and equipment supply. Conversely, however, it is also expected 
to increase the diversity in both market segments. 
Project Size Limitations: 
Overall, the impact of size constraints on the number of firms is broadly neutral while a maximum size limit 
tends to be perceived as increasing diversity and minimum size limit decreasing diversity. However, these 
are rather weak expectations. 
Schedule and Frequency: 
The impact of regular auctions and a published schedule are both perceived to increase the number of firms 
participating in both market segments. However, there is no associated expectation that the same can be 
said for actor diversity, with weak but neutral perceptions. 
Price-Only, Uniform & Renumeration Type: 
The effect of the auction price rule and the remuneration structure are broadly neutral for both market 
segments across number and diversity of firms. A slightly positive expectation can be seen for the use of 
price-only and uniform price auction, but it is rather weak. 
Realization:  
A long realization period is expected by the experts interviewed to have a moderate positive effect on the 
number and the diversity of market participants.  
4.4.2 Discussion of Expert Responses 
Interviewees in finance, equipment supply and in project development perceive the UK CfD allocation system 
to be broadly effective for enabling offshore wind investment in the UK. The contract form (sliding premium) 
is considered appropriate to the task of managing revenue risk in the UK electricity market but there were 
few strong expert opinions on how this would shape market concentration. 
A general observation in the UK offshore wind sector is the expert view that the impact of auction design on 
both the number and diversity of firms is relatively muted compared to the general policy environment. An 
explanation for this trend is proposed by multiple interviewees is the nature of the UK offshore wind project 
timeline. In order to participate in the financial support allocation, project developers must successfully 
acquire legal access to the seabed from The Crown Estate, a statutory corporation responsible for managing 
the UK seabed (Fitch-Roy, 2016).  
Seabed leases are allocated in a series of ‘rounds’ which entail substantial commitment from project 
developers and, in the most recent fourth round, some competition between bidders for leases (The Crown 
Estate, 2019).  
An important observation here is that the detailed auction design was not known at the time when developers 
were required to commit to very large investments in project development to secure a lease. 
Consequently, the market in project development is largely shaped by the leasing process, rather than the 
support allocation process. There are few if any opportunities for new entrants once the leasing is concluded 
and the sunk costs involved in reaching that stage of the process act to deter market exit.  
Another way to consider the leasing process is as an extremely stringent pre-qualification process within the 
overall allocation system, although this is not how the interviewees tend to perceive it with most considering 
it a separate policy area.  
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In many ways, the auction design has followed the demands of the leasing programme, for example project 
sizes in the auction must reflect the sizes of the projects in the pipeline, leading to experts reporting little 
impact of these DEs on market concentration.  
Future research into the effect of the leasing arrangements on market concentration could be very valuable. 
Among DEs, the most consistently positive impact on the number of actors is observed in the publication of 
an auction schedule and regularity of auctions, which is borne out in the increasing number of financial actors 
taking stakes in projects at increasingly early phases of project development. 
Interestingly, this tendency is not seen by experts to apply equally to the diversity of actors, perhaps 
underlining the limited scope for participation by small firms in offshore wind development.  
Interviewees were generally ambivalent about the potential effect of technology neutrality, with the effect on 
the number of participants negative but a positive impact on their diversity. But it is also important to note 
that the technology basket auction system has been designed to particularly favour offshore wind, and 
previous research has shown that proponents of other technologies participating the CfD auctions may not 
have had an equally positive experience (Fitch-Roy & Woodman, 2016; Woodman & Fitch-Roy, 2019). The 
observed results in Figure 17 may indicate an expectation that a technology neutral auction would limit the 
success of offshore wind in favour of (presently) cheaper technologies for which the typical market 
participant is smaller, such as onshore wind and solar PV. 
Interviewees noted that while the market for turbine supply was highly international, the relative size of the 
UK market meant that a clear timeline for auctions, and a generally supportive policy environment (especially 
industrial policy) could have some positive impact on the entry of new OEM actors. The success of small but 
innovative floating offshore wind projects raise the possibility of specialist OEMs entering the UK market, but 
interviewees anticipate that turbine supply in the UK offshore wind sector will remain highly concentrated. 
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4.5 The Relative Importance of Auctions 
In general terms, interviewed experts held a range of sometimes diverging views as to whether auctions, 
auction DEs, or context conditions, are most important in terms of shaping the number and diversity of actors 
in the two value chain segments of interest (as shown in Figure 18).  
In Peru, for example, the overall use of auctions (as opposed to context factors, and specific auction DEs), 
were perceived to be a relatively more influential determinant of the number and diversity of project 
developers and component manufacturers, while specific auction DEs or context conditions were found to 
be of secondary importance.13 Overall, interviewed experts consider that auctions have an important role to 
play in establishing competitive electricity prices, and thereby helping to solidify ambition around 
transitioning towards a low-carbon power system and away from a coal-fired power system that many 
perceive as inefficient, polluting and heavily subsidised. Auctions are generally seen as an important tool for 
realising competitive electricity prices.  
In South Africa, the overall picture is less clear, with recorded responses not allowing for the clear 
identification of a most influential determinant of the number of project developers or component 
manufacturers. With respect to the diversity of project developers and component manufacturers, however, 
specific DEs may have represented a defining factor in South Africa.  
In Spain, experts’ judgements clearly point towards the relative importance of context conditions for both the 
number and diversity of component manufacturers. With respect to project developers, experts’ responses 
indicate that both context conditions and specific DEs may have been critical for the number of developers, 
while the latter may have been slightly more influential for component manufacturers. 
In the case of the UK, there is no consensus among interviewed experts regarding the most important 


















                                                             
13 Peruvian experts also reported that auctions are seen to be a well-established tool in the international context, and a 
critical part of helping attract international attention towards investing in renewable energy projects in Peru. Several 
interviewed experts mentioned that for Peru to develop a competitive and scaled-up renewable energy sector, it is vital 
that it develops a market that can compete internationally, including with, for example, neighbouring Chile and Brazil, 
which may be viewed by some as currently being more established and experienced markets.     
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Figure 18: The relative importance of auctions, design elements and context conditions 
 
Source: Own elaboration (2020) 
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4.6 The Relative Importance of Design Elements 
The relative importance of the perceived impact of auction DEs on the number and diversity of project 
developers and component manufacturers across all case countries is shown in Figure 19 and Figure 20, 
respectively. It can be observed that there is a broad spread in terms of how DEs affect MC.  
As a general observation, many auction DEs appear to impact MC in the project developer segment of the 
value chain to a greater extent than compared with their level of impact on the component manufacturer 
segment of the value chain, including for both positive and negative effects. This is reasonable, given that 
that stakeholder group is more directly affected by certain specific DEs which, by definition, apply more 
directly to them (e.g. bidder technical and financial prequalification requirements, etc.). It may also be due to 
the interviewed experts’ suggestions that it is more straightforward to observe the dynamics in the project 
developer stakeholder group, and to reason on the internal business decision-making criteria of project 
developers as a group, as compared to component manufacturers.   
Frequently implementing auction rounds, as well as having a transparent and credible schedule of upcoming 
auctions, was unambiguously found to be the most important (increasing) driver of both the number and 
diversity of project developers and component manufacturers. At the other end of the spectrum, 
prequalification requirements of all types were reported to be the design element that most negatively affects 
(decreasing) the number and diversity of project developers in particular; and, to a lesser extent, component 
manufacturers.  
The perceived impact of some DEs (see, for example, maximum project size limitations) on the number or 
diversity of component manufacturers was found to be strongly concordant, with only few deviations and / 
or outliers. These observations appear in Figure 19 and Figure 20 as lines without boxes and whiskers.  
Figure 19: Impact of Design Elements on the Number of Developers and Component Manufacturers 
 
Source: Own elaboration (2020) 
Figure 20: Ranking of Design Element Impact Strength on Diversity of Developers and Component 
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Manufacturers 
 
Source: Own elaboration (2020) 
4.7 The Relative Importance of Context Conditions 
Context conditions and related factors were found to almost exclusively affect the number and diversity of 
project developers and component manufacturers in a neutral or positive way (see Figure 21). 
In South Africa, the perceived positive effect seems to be especially strong on the number of project 
developers and component manufacturers where Policy Framework Conditions, Socioeconomic Factors and 
Context Factors are concerned. Some interviewed experts underlined their view that South Africa has a well-
developed and capable financial services sector, which facilitates the timely development of competitive and 
viable RE projects. Moreover, experts consistently expressed that South Africa has a relatively 
comprehensive and clear RE strategy and policy framework in place. However, the role of key public 
institutions could be improved, especially in terms of offering a clear timetable for future auctions and, most 
importantly, sticking to that timetable.    
It was also mentioned that South Africa’s project developers and component manufacturers have benefitted 
from the experience obtained and lessons learned during the country’s initial RE auction rounds. This has 
allowed them to improve their operational approaches and for a more mature value chain to become 
established. On the other hand, it was mentioned during some interviews that South Africa’s Established 
Policies category can be a negative impactor on the prevailing state of the project developer and component 
manufacturer value chain segments, as a consequence of the continued importance of the coal- and 
coalfired power generation sector in the South Africa. The coal industry has considerable lobbying powers 
and continues to exert a strong influence on broader energy sector policy making. It was suggested that this 
may hamper the development of country’s RE sector, which could in turn lead to overall more concentrated 
RE project developer and component manufacturing value chain segments.  
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Figure 21: The Influence of Contextual Factors on the Number and Diversity of Developers and Manufacturers 
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5 Discussion 
5.1 Overall Findings 
The country level analysis, as well as the cross-sectional comparison, show that the auctions and auction 
DEs have a marked effect on the number and diversity of project developers and component manufacturers. 
Some DEs appear to induce large impacts MC, whereas others have a very modest influence.  
The positive and negative impacts of specific DEs on MC are perceived to be more pronounced for project 
developers, than for component manufacturers. In other words, project developers seem to be more 
“exposed” and affected by auction DEs as regards the two considered measures of market concentration. As 
one expert phrased it, “project developers find themselves at the sharp and business end of RE auctions, 
whereas component manufacturers are relatively more shielded.”  
Some DEs stand out as having a consistently strong positive (increasing) or negative (decreasing) impact on 
the number and diversity of project developers and component manufacturers; impacts that are observed in 
all four countries of analysis. The use of transparent publicly-disclosed auction schedules, as well as 
conducting auctions with high frequency, are clearly considered to be elements which increase the number 
and diversity of project developers and component manufacturers; a trend that was also observed in all four 
countries. The opposite is true for all kinds of prequalification requirements. Whilst many interviewed experts 
stated that prequalification requirements are clearly necessary to ensure that bids are received from serious 
and capable bidders (i.e. increasing the likelihood of relatively high project realisation rates), strict 
prequalification requirements can strongly limit the ability of smaller scale organisations to participate in the 
auction.   
It seems that certain “hot” DEs will, other things being equal, tend to push the project development segment 
of a solar PV, wind power, or CSP market to become more, or less, concentrated, than is the case for the 
component manufacturing segment. This does not mean that the presence of a certain hot DE will 
automatically result in a market becoming more concentrated, or less concentrated. For one thing, tangible 
impacts on MC may depend on two (or more) DEs being simultaneously adopted (e.g. strong prequalification 
and a schedule, but not lenient prequalification and a schedule). Moreover, broader context conditions also 
play a role in shaping MC. The overall degree of influence of auctions and auction DEs is limited.  
With respect to project developers, there is significant variance in responses indicating quite a high degree 
of uncertainty with respect to the impact of some DEs. On the other hand, for other DEs (e.g. prequalification 
requirements, the existence of a schedule of auctions), there is markedly little variation in experts’ responses 
and the perceived relationship of those DEs on MC is clear. The perceived impacts on component 
manufacturers that are centred around the neutral are much more concentrated. It is, however, uncertain 
whether low variance around the neutral can be understood as a sign of consensus of experts’ judgments, 
or whether a neutral response rather reflects the expert’s lack of knowledge of the true effect. 
The perceived relative importance of auctions, as compared to specific auction DEs and context conditions, 
varies considerably between countries with respect to their impact on the two measures of MC. If anything, 
this confirms the assumption that auctions themselves are by no means the major determinant of MC in the 
two considered stages of the value chain. Country-specific context (and other) factors will always also play 
a certain role in shaping the prevailing MC.  
In Peru, for example, the use of auctions themselves (and not specific auction DEs, or context factors) is 
clearly considered to be the most important determinant of MC. Possible reasons for this general viewpoint 
include that Peru’s RE sector and market has been built up entirely through the use of auctions. Prior to the 
first use of auctions, Peru did not operate a FiT remuneration system for renewable. Several interviewed 
experts consider that the use of auctions is critically important as a means of uncovering real and competitive 
power prices, which is a prerequisite if solar PV and wind power projects are to be able to compete with fossil 
fuel fired generation plant which benefit from substantial subsidies from government, and hence facilitate 
eating into the market shares of incumbent firms.  
This is broadly in line with the findings of research conducted within the first AURES project (please refer to 
Del Río 2017a). That research, which also focused on the most recent auction round held in Peru, uncovered 
that “motivations to implement auctions include perceived technical capacity constraints by the regulator in 
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defining administratively-set FiTs.” This viewpoint does not seem to have shifted much in the interim period 
from 2018 to spring 2020. Despite their relative complexity and the various trade-offs that need to be taken 
in their design, key experts on Peru’s RE auction continue to perceive that the use of auctions is critical in the 
context of the ongoing development of the country’s RE sector.     
In South Africa, however, there is no clear distinction between auctions, auction DEs and contextual factors, 
in terms of their respective perceived levels of importance in affecting MC. However, as concerns actor 
diversity, the conclusion is far clearer: auction DEs are the most important determinant of MC (for both 
project developers and component manufacturers). South Africa’s RE auction programme includes certain 
measures (requirements on bidders) that ensure a (minimum 40%) participation of the local South African 
workforce in projects as well as the use of broad evaluation criteria for black economic empowerment. In 
terms of the diversity of operational companies, there is a stark contrast between South Africa’s pre-RE power 
market and sector (i.e. up to 2011) which was heavily dominated by the State-owned enterprise (Eskom) on 
the one hand, and the power sector that is evolving from 2011 onwards, on the other hand. Interviewed 
experts broadly consider that such a level of diversity (and hence lowered MC) would not have been realised 
without it being required vis-à-vis the relevant auction DE.  
The results for Spain suggest that the use of auctions is the least important determinant of number and 
diversity (MC) in that country’s wind power market, whereas contextual factors are of highest importance in 
determining MC for component manufacturers. One possible reason for the relative high degree of 
importance awarded to contextual factors could be that RE auctions are mandated to be used for all EU 
Member States, and as such, are now simply part of the landscape. Perhaps what matters most now are 
(stable) macro-economic conditions and an unambiguous commitment at the national level to continue to 
decarbonise the country’s power sector and broader economy. In addition, the retroactive cuts adopted in 
Spain in the past, which are an important part of the context conditions (policy stability) and not related to 
the type of RE support scheme in place (whether administratively-set remuneration or remuneration set via 
auctions) probably figure prominently in the minds of experts as a major aspect influencing RE deployment.   
In the case of the UK (offshore wind), a range of views were shared and there is no consensus among 
interviewed experts regarding the most important determinant of MC amongst project developers and 
component manufacturers. In this context, it’s important to bear in mind that offshore wind project 
development rights are awarded at much larger scale (i.e. a project developer wins the rights to develop a 
single major-scale (e.g. 1 GW) offshore wind project in a pre-defined site); this is a different approach overall 
to the approach used in Peru, South Africa and Spain for solar PV and wind power.  
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6 Conclusions 
6.1 Summary of Findings 
This study has attempted to analyse the hypothesis that: 
Some design elements in auctions are likely to have a considerable impact on the number and diversity of 
project developers and component manufacturers, whereas the effects of other DEs are likely to be very 
small or negligible. In particular, the existence of a high frequency of auctions (more than once a year), a 
schedule of auctions and stringent prequalification requirements are expected to be very relevant in this 
regard. 
The findings of the expert elicitation process conducted on the case countries of Spain, South Africa, Peru 
and the United Kingdom suggest that the hypothesis cannot be rejected. The expert elicitation process has 
established support for the existence of impactful DEs that are expected to affect the number and diversity 
of project developers and component manufacturers. Broadly speaking, DEs tend to affect the value chains 
of the four considered countries in quite similar ways. However, there are substantial technology and country 
differences, in line with our idea that the impact of auctions and auction DEs can be expected to be both RE 
technology-specific and country-specific 
The DEs which tend to increase the number and diversity of project developers and component 
manufacturers to the largest extent include a high frequency of auction rounds and the existence of a 
transparent schedule of auctions. The DEs that tend to decrease the number and diversity of project 
manufacturers and component manufacturers to the largest extent include the use of strict prequalification 
requirements (including those of a technical, financial or other nature).  
It is worthwhile underlining that the DEs which tend to affect MC to a greater extent (i.e. the frequency of 
auction rounds, existence (or not) of a transparent schedule, and prequalification requirements), are the DEs 
that are most likely to get tangled up with non-auction policy areas. These DEs have implications for, and are 
affected and shaped by, certain factors that lie outside of auction theory. For instance, within auctions in the 
UK offshore wind sector, the frequency of holding auctions interacts with inter alia the expansion of the 
(offshore) electricity network; and the requirements and process around bidder prequalification is affected 
by the approach towards the lease of the seabed. The schedule of future auctions can be an element of 
broader industrial development policy, climate policy and wider economic policy making. In Spain’s onshore 
wind sector, decisions related to the frequency and schedule of auctions are also not taken in the isolation 
of auction policymaking. Spain has established, via its National Integrated Energy and Climate Change Plan, 
that auctions will be held at least once per year during the period 2020 to 2030, awarding at least 3000MW 
rights, per year. At the same time, this commitment can be revised in function of progress in meeting climate 
change mitigation targets, and broader industrial policy (including progress in promoting the establishment 
of strong and competitive value chains). 
Whilst some DEs appear to affect MC is discernible and important ways, it also appears that some DEs have 
only a marginal impact, or indeed no discernible impact whatsoever, on the level of MC (i.e. the number and 
diversity) of project developers and component manufacturers. Some examples of DEs in this regard include 
for instance the use of price only (i.e. not multicriteria) auctions, and the use of uniform (as opposed to pay-
as-bid) auctions. In the case of some DEs, this seems to be because the effect is generally marginal (neutral); 
and in the case of other DEs, the perceived positive and negative impacts on MC effectively cancel each other 
out.  
These results suggest some policy implications. First, if the number and diversity of firms is to be increased, 
then those DEs which appear to have the largest influence on MC should be adopted, taking into account 
that this may entail conflicts with other goals. Second, in addition, these can be complemented with other 
design elements which directly influence MC and the diversity of firms, such as seller concentration rules and 
contingents or special rules for small projects.14 Notwithstanding, our results also indicate that those 
                                                             
14 See, for example, “Auctions and Renewable Energy Communities” (February 2020), as published by the AURES 2 
consortium. Accessible via:  
http://aures2project.eu/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/AURES_II_D4_2_energy_communities.pdf  
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measures will necessarily be limited, taking into account that auctions and auction DEs are only part of the 
story. In other words, auctions and auction DEs are only a restricted subset of all the factors with a potential 
influence on the number and diversity of firms.15 
6.2 Limitations of the Study and Methodology 
Certain limitations exist as regards the validity of the study and the robustness of the findings. These can be 
attributed to the methodology itself and its implementation.  
The expert elicitation approach must follow a strict and robust protocol to facilitate the uncovering of experts’ 
understandings and views which are not available or observable elsewhere, whilst at the same time ensuring 
minimizing potential biases. While a robust protocol was developed for this study, expert elicitations have 
neither been previously conducted in this study’s field of research, and seldomly with qualitative data 
(although Likert scale responses can also be quantitative).  
Limitations of the study’s external validity also include the inherent difficulty of extrapolating findings from 
the country cases to the global level. Context factors define the socio-economic landscape in which RE 
auctions take place. This study has found that country-specific contextual factors are important 
determinants of the number and diversity of project developers and component manufacturers in each 
respective country. Whilst country-specific contextual factors were considered within the study, they were 
not empirically evaluated. Case country findings are case country specific because the effect stemming from 
auctions and DEs cannot be disentangled from its context.  
Nevertheless, this study has identified patterns of DEs with similar effects on MC (number and diversity) 
across countries, which may hint towards the existence of globally relevant effects. This suggests the 
existence of important implications for policy makers and authorities responsible for the design of RE 
auctions, in their efforts to balance market development and MC objectives, with more explicit auction 
outcome objectives (such as yielding competitive prices, and the timely development of projects, amongst 
other things).    
 
                                                             
15 This study has focused on two segments of the RE value chain, namely project developers and component 
manufacturers. Future research around this topic could be expanded to also focus on other value chain segments, such 
as O&M service providers, and other key stakeholder groups which impact on the dynamics of RE markets (e.g. banks 
and lending institutions).   
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